



31 DECEMBER 2024



Banco Sabadell Annual Report on Director Remuneration





Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Introduction | 2 |
| 1. Banco Sabadell Director Remuneration Policy 2024, 2025 and 2026 | 3 |
| 2. Application of the Director Remuneration Policy in 2024 | 7 |
| 2.1. Remuneration for Executive Directors | 8 |
| 2.2. Directors' remuneration for their functions as members of the Board of Directors | 26 |
| 3. Director Remuneration Policy applicable in 2025 | 29 |
| 3.1. Remuneration for Executive Directors | 30 |
| 3.2. Remuneration for Directors for their functions as members of the Board of Directors | 46 |
| 4. Procedures and bodies involved in determining and approving the Remuneration Policy | 50 |
| 4.1. General framework | 50 |
| 4.2. Remuneration benchmarking and external advisers | 51 |
| 5. Measures to reduce exposure to excessive risks and contribute to sustainable performance | 54 |
| 6. Reconciliation with the CNMV Annual Report on Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies | 58 |
| 7. Statistical annex | 64 |

Annual Report on Director Remuneration

This is the Annual Report on Director Remuneration of Banco de Sabadell, S.A. (hereinafter Banco Sabadell, the Institution or the Bank).

The Banco Sabadell Annual Report on Director Remuneration (the Report) is drawn up with the information from the Bank at 2024 year-end in compliance with the provisions of article 541 of Legislative Royal Decree 1/2010, of 2 July, approving the consolidated text of the Capital Companies Law (LSC), and Circular 4/2013, of 12 June, of the Spanish National Securities Market Commission (CNMV).

This Report, together with the statistical annex in Section 7, was submitted as a regulatory disclosure to the CNMV and will be submitted for a consultative vote as a separate item on the agenda at the Bank's forthcoming Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, to be held in 2025. This Report is also available in the "Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy" section of the Banco Sabadell Group corporate website (www.grupobancosabadell.com).

The Director Remuneration Policy for 2024, 2025 and 2026, approved by the General Meeting of Shareholders on 23 March 2023 for a three-year term, is applicable until 2026.

This Report includes a summary of the new Director Remuneration Policy that has been applicable since the date of its approval, and describes how it was applied during 2024.

For more details, consult the Director Remuneration Policy at the following link: <https://www.grupbancsabadell.com/corp/en/corporate-governance-and-remuneration-policy/director-remuneration-policy.html>.

This Report was produced in line with best practices and recommendations and was drafted in clear, concise, simple language in pursuit of transparency and to provide full information about the application of remuneration policy.

www.grupbancsabadell.com

**>Corporate Governance
and Remuneration Policy**

>Director Remuneration Policy

1. Banco Sabadell Director Remuneration Policy 2024, 2025 and 2026

1.1. General Principles of the Banco Sabadell Remuneration Policy

The Banco Sabadell Remuneration Policy is focused on creating long-term value by aligning the interests of its shareholders and employees, and it is coherent with the strategic goals in terms of risks and the business, and with the Bank's values, all under a prudent risk management approach while avoiding conflicts of interest.

In accordance with the general principles of the Banco Sabadell Group Remuneration Policy, the principles upon which the Director Remuneration Policy is based are as follows:

1 Promoting medium- and long-term sustainability of the business and the company, in addition to alignment with the Group's values

- Alignment of the remuneration with the interests of the shareholders and with long-term value creation.
- Promotion of rigorous risk management, with measures to avoid conflicts of interest.
- Alignment with the Group's long-term business strategy, objectives, values and interests.

The Banco Sabadell Group's Remuneration Policy as a whole contains information on the degree to which it is coherent with integrating sustainability risks. In particular, the following aspects are considered in connection with sustainability:

- The Group's Remuneration Policy and practices are in keeping with its credit risk management approach and with its appetite and strategies in relation to this risk, and do not create any conflicts of interest. These practices also include measures to manage conflicts of interest so as to protect consumers from any undesirable adverse effects.
- The Remuneration Policy and practices integrate sustainability risks by publishing information in this respect on the Group website.
- The Remuneration Policy and practices stimulate behaviour that is coherent with the Group's approach to risk in relation to climate and the environment, as well as the commitments made voluntarily by the Group. The Remuneration Policy and practices promote a long-term approach to the management of climate-related and environmental risks.
- The components of remuneration should contribute to driving action in environmental, social and governance (ESG) matters in order to make the business strategy sustainable and socially responsible.

Banco Sabadell maintains its commitment to sustainability by contributing to promoting action in environmental, social and governance (ESG) matters.

The synthetic sustainability indicator (ISos) incorporates KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) for ESG matters and links them to the short-term variable compensation of executive directors and employees with variable remuneration; those KPIs form part of the group objectives with a weighting of 10%. To reinforce the alignment of executive directors' remuneration with the Group's commitment to sustainability, a synthetic sustainability indicator is defined in the multi-year objectives set by the Group. That indicator is directly linked to long-term remuneration, with a weighting of 20%.

2 Ensuring a competitive, equitable remuneration system (external competitiveness and internal fairness) based on equal remuneration of female and male employees for a given job or a position of equal value

- Able to attract and retain the best talent.
- Rewarding professional track record and responsibility, regardless of the employee's gender.
- Aligned with market standards, while providing flexibility to adapt to changes in the situation and in the demands of the sector.

In terms of equal pay, the Remuneration Policy is gender neutral, in line with the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value, guiding decision-making towards avoiding any gender pay gap, and ensuring equal opportunities as a prerequisite for remuneration to be gender-neutral over the long term.

3 Reward performance by aligning remuneration with the results achieved by the individual without incentivizing the assumption of risks that exceed the level tolerated by the Group.

- An appropriate balance between the various remuneration components.
- Consideration of current and future risks and results, without incentivizing the assumption of risks that exceed the level tolerated by the Group.
- A system that is simple, transparent and clear. The Remuneration Policy must be understandable and easy to communicate to the entire workforce.

The Remuneration Policy is gender neutral, in line with the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value.

Principles applicable to the members of the Board of Directors

| Principles of the Remuneration Policy applicable to Executive Directors | Principles of the Remuneration Policy applicable to the Directors for their functions as members of the Board of Directors |
|---|--|
| <p>A reasonable balance between fixed and variable components (annual and multi-year) to favour appropriate risk-taking combined with the attainment of defined short- and long-term objectives.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Consideration of multiple metrics linked to results, returns, risk management and control, solvency, capital, and strategic non-financial objectives linked to sustainability. — Long-term remuneration with a three-year objective measurement period linked to TSR, ESG, sustainability and ROTE objectives and subject to a risk-related correction factor that is a function of fulfilment of capital and liquidity indicators. — Variable remuneration is not guaranteed. — Prudential mechanisms for adjusting the attainment of objectives and other ex-ante adjustments. — Deferral over five years of 60% of the annual variable remuneration for any variable remuneration element. — Payment of more than 50% of the variable remuneration in shares (50% of the up-front part, and 55% of both the deferred part of annual variable remuneration and of the long-term remuneration). — Share lock-up. Executive directors may not dispose of shares they receive until at least three years have elapsed since receipt unless they own shares worth twice their annual fixed remuneration; the shares must be held for at least one year in any event. — Malus and clawback clauses, in accordance with the provisions of the regulations governing credit institutions. — Regular external advice to the Board of Directors and the Remuneration Committee with regard to market practices. | <p>The remuneration is commensurate with the responsibilities and functions assumed by each director without jeopardising their independence.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — They do not qualify for variable remuneration. — They are not remunerated in the form of shares, options or rights relating to shares or instruments linked to the value of the share. — They do not benefit from long-term savings systems such as pension plans, retirement schemes or other similar arrangements. |

The policy also complies with the current European Directives and Regulations and other legislation, in particular Law 10/2014, of 26 June, on the regulation, supervision and solvency of credit institutions, Royal Decree 84/2015, of 13 February, implementing that Law, and Bank of Spain Circular 2/2016, of 2 February, to credit institutions, on supervision and capital adequacy, which completes the adaptation of Spanish law to Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) 575/2013, as well as the EBA Guidelines on internal governance (EBA/GL/2021/05) of 2 July 2021, and EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2021/04, of 2 July, on sound remuneration policies under Directive 2013/36/EU and Delegated Regulation (EU) 923/2021.



2. Application of the Director Remuneration Policy in 2024

The remuneration accrued in 2024 conformed to the terms of the Banco Sabadell Director Remuneration Policy for 2024, 2025 and 2026 approved by the General Meeting of Shareholders on 23 March 2023.

The procedure for applying the Remuneration Policy was adhered to strictly in 2024 and no temporary exceptions were made.

The Annual Report on Director Remuneration for 2023 was submitted to a consultative vote at the General Meeting of Shareholders on 10 April 2024:

The number of shares for which valid votes were cast was 3,361,267,861, distributed as follows:

- 3,256,556 votes in favour, from 3,257,212,363 shares owned by 78,358 shareholders representing 96.911 % of the total capital in attendance, either in presence or by proxy;
- 93,206 votes against, from 93,342,238 shares owned by 1,184 shareholders representing 2.774 % of the total capital in attendance, either in presence or by proxy, and
- 10,586 abstentions, from 10,713,260 shares owned by 537 shareholders representing 0.315 % of the total capital in attendance, either in presence or by proxy.

96.91 %




92.20 %

Increase in the votes in favour

As a result of the commitment to transparency and the implementation of market best practices, the result of the consultative vote on the report increased from 92.20% to 96.91% in favour.

The chart shows the trend, over the last three years, in the outcome of the consultative vote on the Annual Report on Director Remuneration at the General Meeting of Shareholders, showing an increase in the number of votes in favour beginning with the 2022 Annual Report on Director Remuneration as a result of the improvements.

Consultative vote on the Director Remuneration Report (2021-2023)



2.1. Remuneration for Executive Directors

2.1.1. Details of the remuneration items

In addition to their remuneration for membership of the Board of Directors, executive directors are paid for performing executive functions, as provided in the Articles of Association of Banco Sabadell, under the same headings as members of Banco Sabadell Senior Management and the rest of the Identified Staff.

Executive director remuneration is set each year by the Board of Directors within the maximum overall amount established by the General Meeting of Shareholders by approving the Director Remuneration Policy for each remuneration item.

The Board of Directors will comply with the provisions of the applicable legal regulations, taking into account its special status as a financial institution and in accordance with the definitions, terms and conditions set out in the Director Remuneration Policy. The Remuneration Policy contemplates a vision of total remuneration, taking into account all elements of remuneration and the relationship between them, establishing an appropriate balance between fixed and variable remuneration, as well as between the distribution of short- and long-term remuneration, so as to safeguard the rights and interests of shareholders, investors and customers.

The CEO's remuneration mix (variable/fixed) was modified so that the variable proportion rose to 91.6%, from 88.7%, (including discretionary pension benefits) and the proportion of remuneration at risk was set at 56%. The purpose of this ratio is to increase alignment of the CEO's remuneration with shareholders' interests, and with the values and long-term interests of the Banco Sabadell Group, while also linking his compensation more tightly to the risk and business strategy. The remuneration for the CEO was benchmarked against two groups of companies: a peer group composed of 15 banks from Spain and other European countries (the international benchmark), and a peer group made up of 15 Spanish companies, most of them in the IBEX-35 (the domestic benchmark).


The CEO's total remuneration for 2024 is in the 49th percentile of the domestic peer group and the 63rd percentile of the international peer group.

Companies used as benchmark

| Banks in the international benchmark | | Companies in the domestic benchmark | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| ABN Amro Group | KBC Groep | Abanca | Ferrovial |
| Banco BPM | Mediobanca | Acciona | Fluidra |
| Bankinter | Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken | Amadeus | Grifols |
| BBVA | Standard Chartered Bank | Bankinter | Mapfre |
| BPER Banca | Raiffeisen | BBVA | Merlin Properties |
| Caixabank | Swedbank | Caixabank | Santander Spain |
| Erste Group | Virgin Money | Enagás | Siemens Gamesa |
| Intesa San Paolo | | Endesa | |

The executive directors' individual remuneration for 2024, in thousand euro, is shown below.

| | CEO (thousand euro) | CRO (thousand euro) |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| Fixed salary | 1,664 | 581 |
| Benefits and remuneration in kind | 29 | 42 |
| Retirement and savings plans | 301 | 111 |
| Short-term variable remuneration | 1,096 (128.05% attainment of objectives) | 133 (126.51% attainment of objectives) |
| Long-term remuneration | 1,096 (128.05% attainment of objectives) | 184 (126.51% attainment of objectives) |



A) Fixed remuneration

Fixed salary

- The fixed salary is intended to remunerate the executive director's functions and responsibilities and to recognize their contribution during their tenure.

Benefits and remuneration in kind

- Benefits and remuneration in kind: In 2024, the executive directors were beneficiaries of, inter alia, a group life insurance policy, school aid and Christmas hamper (as applicable to all the Bank's employees) and a medical insurance policy and risk coverage (also applicable to the Bank's management team), and they had the use of a vehicle on the same terms as the other members of Senior Management.


Contributions to retirement and savings plans

- The executive directors are beneficiaries of a defined contribution Group life insurance policy that pays out upon (i) the date of termination of the contract, in the case of the Chief Executive Officer, or on the date of effective retirement, in the case of the CRO, (ii) death or (iii) permanent and absolute disability.
- Of the amounts paid in their name, 85% is classified as fixed remuneration and the other 15% is classified as "discretionary pension benefits", which is treated as variable compensation in accordance with current regulations; it is linked to the percentage of attainment of the beneficiary's short-term objectives, and may not exceed 100% of the amount in any event.
- The reported amounts include contributions to other policies that cover the executive directors in the same way as the other employees. Specifically, the employer pension plan for Group B (defined contribution), which will pay out upon retirement as employees.



B) 2024 Short-term variable remuneration

The short-term variable remuneration in 2024 was as follows:



B.1.) Percentage attainment of Group targets for 2024

Assessment methods were established consisting of defining attainment parameters between 50% and 150% for each of the objectives, based on a non-linear scale of attainment established beforehand by the Remuneration Committee. Attainment of under 50% is considered as 0% for the purposes of counting general attainment. On 29 January 2025, the Board of Directors determined the degree of attainment of the Group objectives, applying the weightings established at the beginning of the year. The objective and levels of attainment are indicated in the following table.



| Metric | Definition | Weighting | Threshold ⁽¹⁾ | Maximum result ⁽²⁾ | % Attainment |
|--|---|-------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|
| ROTE | Return on tangible equity | 15% | 10.6% | 14.6% | 150.0% |
| Group net profit | Profit that is directly attributable to the parent company, calculated by deducting minority interests from profit for the year. | 15% | 1.2 B€ | 1.8 B€ | 142.0 % |
| Net interest income plus net fees and commissions | Banco Sabadell Group consolidated net interest income plus net fees and commissions in 2024. | 15 % | 5.9 B€ | 6.4 B€ | 139.3 % |
| Group expenses + Depreciation & amortization | Total consolidated expenses under the headings of staff expenses, general expenses and real estate expenses not already included under the first two categories (staff and general). | 10% | 3.3 B€ | 3.1 B€ | 112.1% |
| Asset quality | Cost of Risk (5%) + NPA volume (5%) + Coverage ratio (5%) | 15% | | | 146.8 % |
| CoR | | | 0.57% | 0.37% | 140.4 % |
| NPA volume | | | 6.9 B€ | 6.5 B€ | 150.0% |
| Total NPA coverage | | | 51.4% | 55.4% | 150.0% |
| Market share | A synthetic indicator focused on increasing profitability and business volume; it is composed of indicators of market share of loans and advances in Spain, market share of mortgages in the United Kingdom through subsidiary TSB, and market share of net fees and commissions with respect to credit institutions operating in Spain. | 10% | 50.0% | 150.0% | 75.0 % |
| Service quality | A synthetic indicator that reflects the rating of quality of service by the Group's customers, distinguishing between commercial segments and relationship channels, weighted by the strategic focus of each segment (individuals, businesses, SMEs, private, corporate, branch, internet, mobile, etc.) and the employee satisfaction index. | 10% | 50.0% | 150.0% | 113.3 % |
| Sustainability | A synthetic evaluation indicator made up of environmental and gender equality indicators: Green and sustainability-linked financing, diversity (% female executives), upgrades by the main rating agencies/ESG indices and Sustainable Finance Plan. | 10% | 50.0% | 150.0% | 133.0 % |
| Total | | 100% | | | 130.06 % |

(1) Threshold for attainment of the objective

(2) Maximum result, above which attainment is constant at 150%

The Banco Sabadell Group achieved a record €1,827 million in profit in 2024, an increase of 37.1% over the previous year. The bank continued to demonstrate its financial strength, driven mainly by good performance of the core result and the continuing positive trend in asset quality, which enabled progress to be made in reducing provisions and led, in turn, to an improvement in the total cost of risk.

This level of profits translates into a 343 basis point year-on-year increase in the Group's RoTE. This improvement raised profitability to 14.9% at the end of 2024.

The Group objectives for 2024 are detailed below:

- **Net profit:** Profit that is directly attributable to the parent company, calculated by deducting minority interests from profit for the year.
This objective is weighted 15.0% of the total, and attainment at 2024 year-end was 142%.
- **RoTE:** measures the return on the company's average tangible equity. The numerator is the profit attributable to the group and the denominator is the average equity less intangible assets and goodwill.
This metric is weighted 15.0%, and attainment at 2024 year-end was 150%.
- **Net banking revenues:** this metric reflects the revenues related most directly to the banking business, consisting of the Group's net interest income and net fees and commissions.
This metric is weighted 15% of the total, and attainment at 2024 year-end was 139.3%.
- **Expenses:** includes expenses borne by the Bank, comprising personnel expenses, general expenses and expenses derived from the real estate business that are not already included in the preceding categories.
This metric is weighted 10% of the total, and attainment at 2024 year-end was 112.1%
- **Asset quality:** this objective comprises three indicators. One is the Cost of Risk, calculated as the sum of provisions for loan losses and other financial assets divided by the sum of gross loans and advances to customers, non-performing properties and guarantees, which provides information about losses per unit loan granted. Another is the balance of NPAs (Non-Performing Assets), comprising the sum of Stage 3 assets and non-performing properties. The third is the Total NPA Coverage, calculated as the ratio of provisions for non-performing assets (NPAs) to total non-performing assets.
This metric is weighted 15% (5% each metric), and attainment at 2024 year-end was 146.8%

The information used to calculate the financial indicators is derived from audited data in the financial statements using the definition that applied when they were first set.

The non-financial metrics are detailed below:

- **Service quality:** a synthetic indicator that reflects feedback on the quality of service, grouping the following variables:

| Variable | Definition | Weighting | Attainment |
|-----------------------|--|-------------|---------------|
| Employee satisfaction | Outcome of annual employee satisfaction survey | 33.3 % | 137.5 % |
| Customer satisfaction | Sabadell Spain <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Overall satisfaction with branch — NPS Individuals — NPS Businesses — NPS SMEs — NPS Companies — NPS Private Banking | 46.7% | 110.3% |
| | TSB <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Bank NPS Channels NPS (<i>Mobile, Branch, Telephone banking, and Internet banking</i>) | 13.3% | 53.5% |
| | Corporate & Investment Banking <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — NPS Spain and Ofex EMEA | 6.7% | 128.6% |
| Total | — | 100% | 113.3% |

- **Sustainability indicator:** a synthetic indicator of sustainability that is weighted 10% in the Group's objectives and is composed of the following variables:

| Variable | Definition | Weighting | Attainment |
|--------------------------|---|-------------|---------------|
| Rating agencies | Improve the score in the main ESG indices (MSCI, Sustainalytics, DJSI) | 20% | 123.7% |
| Sustainable Finance Plan | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Number of IRCA assessments performed — New decarbonization pathways. — Fulfilment of established decarbonization pathways | 20% | 127.2% |
| Diversity | % Female executives | 20% | 114.1% |
| Sustainable Business | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Sustainable finance — FvS finance | 40% | 150.0% |
| Total | — | 100% | 133.0% |

This indicator is monitored periodically by the Sustainability Committee, and its metrics are updated as part of this review. Attainment of this metric in 2024 was 133.0%.

B.2.) Attainment of objectives by the CEO

The CEO's final attainment of objectives in the year, taking into account all the variables described above and his annual performance review, was 128.05%.

128.05%

Final attainment of objectives in the year

The CEO had 80% of his objectives linked to the Group's objectives and the other 20% were linked to an individual qualitative assessment adopted by the Remuneration Committee on the motion of the Chairman.

The CEO's individual qualitative assessment is based on his contribution and leadership in achieving the Group's strategy, focused on increasing profitability, improving the risk profile and strengthening the solvency of the Banco Sabadell Group. His work in the corporate context of the Bank was also assessed.

The CEO's performance in achieving the following key strategic goals of the Group is particularly noteworthy:

- Once again, since the start of the 2021 strategic plan, the Bank demonstrated its capacity to generate profits and capital thanks to good performance by commercial activity, rigorous cost management and the improvement in its risk profile.
- Specifically, in 2024, the Bank achieved record results, improving its CET1 (Common Equity Tier 1) capital ratio and attaining sustained growth in ROTE (Return on tangible equity).
- This performance was reflected in the share performance with respect to peers: Banco Sabadell was the bank that appreciated the most in the Spanish market and ranked second in performance in the IBEX 35.

The following were also considered in the performance assessment:

- His leadership in executing management initiatives and priorities.
- Representation of the Bank in other bodies and institutions.
- Governance and stakeholder management.

The individual qualitative assessment made by the Remuneration Committee, on a motion by the Chairman, was 120% the highest possible level.



B.3.) Attainment of objectives by the CRO

The CRO's final attainment of objectives in the year, taking into account all the variables described above and his annual performance review, was 126.51%.

The CRO had 25% of his annual variable remuneration tied to Group objectives. The other 75% was indexed to individual objectives which, in turn, are composed of functional objectives and an individual qualitative assessment. These functional objectives are aligned with the oversight functions he performs, independent of the business and corporate areas, and are focused on the oversight and monitoring of transactions and of the risks that arise from such transactions, ensuring compliance with applicable laws, rules and regulations, and advising management on matters in his area of expertise.

In this regard, the 2024 functional objectives set for the CRO were assessed on the basis of the following parameters:

Quantitative objectives:

- Improvement in the SREP score, weighted 20% of his functional objectives.
- Management satisfaction, weighted 10% of his functional objectives.

Qualitative objectives:

- Contribution to the performance of the Risk Committee, weighted 20%.
- Fulfilment of the annual plans for the second line of defence (2LoD), weighted 25%.
- Tracking of RAROC on acceptance and profitability of new initiatives, weighted 10%.
- Development and implementation of an annual regulatory model plan, weighted 7.5%.
- Fulfilment of the ICAAP Remediation Plan, weighted 7.5%.

The CRO attained 129.08% of his functional objectives for 2024.

The individual qualitative assessment considered the following:

- Continuity and strengthening of his performance in all key areas under his responsibility.
- The credibility of his function in the eyes of the Bank's other areas, which has strengthened risk management in the Bank.
- His participation and leadership in achieving recognition, by various bodies and institutions, of the Bank's improvements in the area that he represents.
- His ability to anticipate, identify and manage potential risks, providing the appropriate tools to enable the Group to take strategic decisions.

The CRO attained 115% of his individual qualitative objectives for 2024. This indicator is capped at 120%.

The year-end evaluation of these objectives is the responsibility of the Risk Committee, which proposes the level of attainment and the degree of attainment achieved.

126.51%

Final attainment of objectives in the year

129.08%

Attainment of functional objectives in 2024

The percentage of attainment of objectives by both the CEO and the CRO were approved by the Board of Directors on 29 January 2025.

In order to qualify for variable remuneration, overall attainment of the objectives must exceed 60%. No variable remuneration is accrued under 60%, and no additional variable remuneration is accrued above 144%.

B.4.) Attainment adjustments

The Board of Directors did not consider it necessary to make any adjustments to the level of attainment of the objectives described above, since the Bank's capital (CET1 and MREL) and liquidity (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) fulfilled the limits established in the Risk Appetite Statement (RAS).

The Banco Sabadell Remuneration Committee analyzed the application of the Risk Correction Factor (RCF) to the Group's objectives at a meeting on 28 January 2025. In accordance with the capital and liquidity objectives, metrics, attainment scales and payment curves of the RCF approved by the Board of Directors on 26 January 2024, the Remuneration Committee determined that the thresholds required in the RAS to give entitlement to the entire variable remuneration that corresponds to the attainment of the Group's objectives in this regard had been attained.

In addition, there are prudential mechanisms for adjusting the CRO's individual attainment, based on exceedance of expected loss thresholds in terms of operational risk and/or internal control indicators. No factors arose such as to trigger an adjustment in the degree of attainment.

B.5.) Ex-ante risk adjustments

Based on information provided by the Internal Control Division, the Remuneration Committee decided not to propose any additional individual or collective ex-ante adjustment for 2024, insofar as:

- The Group and/or its subsidiary credit institutions attained the MDA (Maximum Distributable Amount) determined by current regulations.
- In accordance with the reports provided by the Compliance, Internal Audit, Finance and Internal Control Divisions, the short-term variable remuneration for 2024 is aligned with risk and control factors such as breaches of standards and regulations, exceedance of risk limits (e.g. RAS, solvency, liquidity, or breach of expected loss thresholds in terms of operational risk) and/or internal control indicators (e.g. results of internal audits) or similar items.

B.6.) Short-term variable remuneration accrued in 2024

Once the degree of attainment of the objectives at Group and individual level had been calculated, and it had been determined that no ex-ante adjustments were necessary, the variable remuneration to be assigned individually to each of the executive directors was determined. On the basis of each individual's assigned bonus target and attainment of individual objectives, the Board of Directors approved the variable remuneration for the executive directors, on a motion of the Remuneration Committee, at a meeting on 29 January 2025, as follows: €1,096 thousand for the CEO and €133 thousand for the CRO:

In accordance with the applicable regulations, these amounts are paid as follows:

- 40% will be paid in 2025, 50% in cash and the remainder in Banco Sabadell shares (valued at the closing market price in the last trading session in the month in 2025 when the non-deferred portion is paid), the shares being subject to lock-up for at least three years from the date of delivery unless the holder owns an amount equivalent to twice their annual fixed remuneration; in any event the minimum lock-up period is one year.
- 60% will be deferred over a five-year period, with one-fifth being paid in each of the years 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029 and 2029, split 45% in

cash and 55% in Banco Sabadell shares (valued at the closing market price in the last trading session in the month when the non-deferred portion is paid), subject to the same lock-up obligation as the remuneration paid up-front in 2025.

| Form of payment | | Mr. César González-Bueno Mr. David Vegara Figueras | | |
|-----------------|-------------|--|---------|--------|
| Up-front | 2025 | thousand euro | 219 | 27 |
| | | no. of shares | 127,084 | 15,401 |
| Deferred | 2026 | thousand euro | 59 | 7 |
| | | no. of shares | 41,938 | 5,082 |
| | 2027 | thousand euro | 59 | 7 |
| | | no. of shares | 41,938 | 5,082 |
| | 2028 | thousand euro | 59 | 7 |
| | | no. of shares | 41,938 | 5,082 |
| | 2029 | thousand euro | 59 | 7 |
| | | no. of shares | 41,938 | 5,082 |
| | 2030 | thousand euro | 59 | 7 |
| | | no. of shares | 41,938 | 5,082 |

NOTE: Since the shares will be delivered on the last trading day in February, the number of shares in this table was calculated using the weighted average price of the last 20 sessions in December 2024 (€1.725 per share). The number of shares will be updated using the closing price in the last session in February, once it is known.

The deferred amounts and shares are subject to malus and clawback clauses as described in section 3.1.2.B) of this Report.

In accordance with the provisions of CNMV Circular 4/2013, of 12 June, the non-deferred amount payable in cash in 2025 is set out in section C.1.a.i) of the Statistical Annex. Table C.1.a.ii) sets out both delivered shares (financial instruments that vested in 2024) and deferred shares (financial instruments at the end of 2024).

B.7.) Variable remuneration deferred from prior years that is payable in 2025

As supplementary information to tables C.1.a) i) and ii) of the Statistical Annex, it is hereby disclosed that the amount in cash and the shares for deferral for 5 years out of the short-term variable remuneration accrued in preceding years, and the severance payment for termination as executive director of Ms. María José García Beato in 2021, all in accordance with the Director Remuneration Policy, were delivered to the executive directors in 2025.

Below is a detail of the amounts of cash and shares in 2025 corresponding to deferred variable remuneration from prior years:

| | | Mr. César González-Bueno | Mr. David Vega Figuera | Mr. Josep Oliu Creus ¹ | Ms. María José García Beato ¹ |
|---|---------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| 2021 variable remuneration | thousand euro | 30 | 5 | 19 | — |
| | no. of shares | 47,513 | 8,490 | 30,278 | — |
| 2022 variable remuneration | thousand euro | 38 | 5 | — | — |
| | no. of shares | 37,305 | 5,427 | — | — |
| 2023 variable remuneration | thousand euro | 53 | 6 | — | — |
| | no. of shares | 54,222 | 6,380 | — | — |
| Long-term remuneration 2019-2021 | thousand euro | — | 5 | 20 | 5 |
| | no. of shares | — | 5,384 | 23,280 | 6,088 |
| Long-term remuneration 2020-2022 | thousand euro | — | 6 | — | 5 |
| | no. of shares | — | 21,097 | — | 16,797 |
| Long-term remuneration 2021-2023 | thousand euro | 151 | 30 | 38 | — |
| | no. of shares | 313,572 | 63,042 | 78,439 | — |
| Termination indemnities | thousand euro | — | — | — | 44 |
| | no. of shares | — | — | — | 102,232 |

(1) Deferred amounts accrued in the period in which they were executive directors.

NOTE: For the 2023 variable remuneration in shares, the number of instruments was updated with the Bank's share price at the close of the last trading session in the month of settlement and payment of the immediate (not deferred) variable remuneration to match the actual accrued values. As a result, in table C.1.a.(ii) of the statistical annex on changes in share-based remuneration systems, the number of financial instruments for the 2023 variable remuneration at the beginning of 2024 does not match the amount that was reported in the 2023 Report on Director Remuneration for the end of 2023.

The Remuneration Committee assessed whether the conditions are met for the application of the clauses for the reduction or cancellation of the deferred variable remuneration (malus clauses) and the recovery of the amounts received (clawback clauses), based on the characteristics and circumstances of each particular case, and it concluded that none of the cases that would trigger such clauses arose in 2024.




C) Long-term remuneration

In the case of executive directors, long-term remuneration consists of the allocation to each beneficiary ("Incentive") of a certain amount in cash determined as a percentage of each beneficiary's fixed compensation (the "Target Incentive") approved by the Board of Directors. The incentive is paid 55% in shares of the Company and 45% in cash.

Payment of the Incentive is contingent upon attainment of the annual and multi-year objectives, performance of executive functions and non-termination of the employment or mercantile relationship with Banco Sabadell, S.A.

The structure of the long-term remuneration is shown below:

Scheme for payment of long-term variable remuneration



In the month of February of year n+1 the Adjusted Target is calculated based on the attainment of the Annual Variable Remuneration objectives for year n (60%-150% of the initial target).

The Adjusted Target is the sum of an amount in cash (45%) and an amount in Banco Sabadell shares (55%), calculated during the month of February of year n+1.

Beginning of year n+3: Measurement of multi-year objectives

● Incentive target

● Adjusted target

● Delivery

● Lock-up period

□ Cash (45%)

□ Shares (55%)

The adjusted target can only be maintained or reduced, or even eliminated, depending on the degree of attainment of the Group's multi-year objectives.

This section includes information on long-term remuneration schemes whose measurement periods include the year 2024. The calendars of the long-term incentives that are in force are shown by way of example.

| Long-term remuneration | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 2022-2024 | Beginning of measurement period | | End of measurement period | | |
| 2023-2025 | | Beginning of measurement period | | End of measurement period | |
| 2024-2026 | | | Beginning of measurement period | | End of measurement period |

C.1.) Long-term remuneration 2022-2024

The long-term remuneration scheme for 2022-2024 is based on the attainment of annual and multi-year objectives (3 years), where a reference amount of long-term remuneration (amount to be received in the event of 100% attainment of both annual and multi-year objectives) was established at the beginning of the cycle.

Once 2022 had concluded, the reference amount was adjusted during the first quarter of 2023 based on the degree of attainment of the objectives for 2022 short-term variable remuneration. When determining the adjusted reference amount, the applicability of the ex-ante adjustments described above for the variable remuneration was also analysed (described in section 2.1.1.B, among other sections, of this Report).

| Director | Initial reference amount (thousand euro) | Adjusted reference amount (thousand euro) |
|----------|---|---|
| CEO | 600 | 698 |
| CRO | 131 | 133 |

In accordance with the Director Remuneration Policy, the adjusted reference amounts consisted of a cash amount (45%) and a number of shares (55%) determined using the weighted average price in the last 20 sessions in the month of December 2022, with the following result:

| Director | Amount (thousand euro) | no. of shares |
|----------|------------------------|---------------|
| CEO | 314 | 437,928 |
| CRO | 60 | 83,625 |

Payment of the adjusted reference amount was subject to the following multi-year objectives established for the period 2022-2024:

| Objective | Weighting | Outcome | % Attainment |
|---|-------------|----------|--------------|
| Relative total shareholder return (TSR) | 25% | #1 | 100% |
| Liquidity (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) | 25% | 201.4 % | 100% |
| Capital (CET1) | 25% | 13.93 % | 100% |
| ROTE | 25% | 14.9 % | 100% |
| Total | 100% | — | 100% |

The Group objectives for 2022-2024 are detailed below:

Relative Total Shareholder Return (TSR)

Metric that measures the total return on investment obtained by the shareholder. TSR is taken to be the sum of the dividends paid and the variation in the share price, calculated as the difference between the arithmetic mean of the share's closing price, rounded to the third decimal place, in the first 20 sessions following 1 January 2022 and following 31 December 2024.

Banco Sabadell's TSR is compared with that of the following peer group:

| <i>Peer group</i> | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| ABN AMRO Group NV | Caixabank S.A. | Mediobanca |
| Banco Bpm SpA | Commerzbank AG | Raiffeisen |
| Bankinter S.A. | Erste Group | Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB |
| BBVA, S.A. | Intesa Sanpaolo SpA | Standard Chartered Bank |
| BPER Banca | KBC Groep NV | Swedbank |

Attainment scale:

| Banco Sabadell's TSR ranking within the peer group | % attainment |
|--|--------------|
| Between #1 and #8 | 100% |
| Between #9 and #10 | 75% |
| Between #11 and #12 | 50% |
| Between #13 and #16 | 0% |

Percentage of attainment:

Since Banco Sabadell ranked #1 within the peer group, the percentage of attainment of this metric is 100%.

Liquidity Coverage Ratio

This ratio reveals whether the institution has sufficient liquid assets to enable it to honour its short-term obligations, calculated as the ratio between high quality liquid assets (HQLAs) and net cash outflows in 30 days.

The objective for the Liquidity Coverage Ratio indicator is the level established in the Institution's RAS (Risk Appetite Statement). This indicator is measured by taking the average of the last three months in the final year of the multi-year measurement period.

Attainment scale:

If the average LCR is higher than the early warning indicator (EWI), the objective is deemed to have been achieved 100%; below that threshold, attainment is 0%.

Percentage of attainment:

Since the average LCR for October, November and December 2024 was higher than the early warning indicator (EWI), 100% of the objective is deemed to have been achieved.

Capital adequacy (CET1)

This ratio is the main measure of solvency used in the financial sector. The CET1 ratio is the quotient of Common Equity Tier 1 capital and Risk Weighted Assets.

Attainment of the objective in connection with CET1 is measured on the basis of the level established in the Institution's Risk Appetite Statement (RAS). This indicator is measured by taking the average of the last three months in the final year of the multi-year measurement period.

Attainment scale:

If the average CET1 is higher than the early warning indicator (EWI), the objective is deemed to have been achieved 100%; below that threshold, attainment is 0%.

Percentage of attainment:

Since the average CET1 for October, November and December 2024 was higher than the early warning indicator (EWI), 100% of the objective is deemed to have been achieved.

Return on Tangible Equity (ROTE)

Index that measures the return on minimum equity required to attain the CET1 early warning indicator (EWI). The numerator is the profit attributable to the group and the denominator is the minimum equity required to attain the CET1 early warning indicator (EWI).

Attainment of the objective in connection with the Return on Total Equity is measured on the basis of the ROTE at the end of the period.

Attainment scale:

| Value at end of period Dec. 2024 | % attainment |
|----------------------------------|--------------|
| < 5 % | 0% |
| 5% | 50% |
| 6% | 75% |
| > 7.5 % | 100% |

Percentage of attainment:

Since the ROTE at 31 December 2024 was 14.9%, 100% of the objective is deemed to have been achieved.

Considering the percentages of attainment of the objectives and their weightings, the final percentage of attainment of the 2022-2024 long-term remuneration objectives was 100%. On 28 January 2025, the Remuneration Committee determined that no adjustment of any type is required to be made to this percentage, resulting in the following distribution:

| Director | Amount (thousand euro) | no. of shares |
|----------|------------------------|---------------|
| CEO | 314 | 437,928 |
| CRO | 60 | 83,625 |

The schedule for payment of this incentive, in accordance with the regulatory requirements, is as follows:

| Director | | 2026 (60%) | 2027 (20%) | 2028 (20%) |
|----------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|
| CEO | thousand euro | 188 | 63 | 63 |
| | no. of shares | 262,757 | 87,586 | 87,586 |
| CRO | thousand euro | 36 | 12 | 12 |
| | no. of shares | 50,175 | 16,725 | 16,725 |

Notes:

- These amounts are subject to the malus and clawback clauses established in the Director Remuneration Policy.
- The shares that are delivered are subject to lock-up as described in section 3.1.2.B) on short-term variable remuneration.

C.2.) Long-term remuneration 2023-2025

Long-term remuneration for 2023 was approved in the same terms as for 2022, based on attainment of annual and multi-year objectives, establishing a reference amount of long-term remuneration (the amount to be received in the event of attaining 100% of the objectives).

Once 2023 had concluded, the reference amount was adjusted during the first quarter of 2024 based on the degree of attainment of the objectives for 2023 short-term variable remuneration.

| Director | Initial reference amount (thousand euro) | Adjusted reference amount (thousand euro) | Adjusted reference amount (thousand euro) | Adjusted reference amount (shares) |
|----------|--|---|---|------------------------------------|
| CEO | 751 | (751 x 131.00%) 983 | 443 | 454,130 |
| CRO | 138 | (138 x 115.72%) 160 | 72 | 73,896 |

These amounts are linked to attainment of the long-term objectives defined for the long-term remuneration 2023-2025 and may not exceed the indicated amounts in any event.

C.3. Long-term remuneration 2024-2026

Long-term remuneration was approved for 2024 in the same terms as that approved for 2023, based on the fulfilment of annual and multi-year objectives.


Once 2024 had concluded, the reference amount was adjusted during the first quarter of 2025 based on the degree of attainment of the objectives for 2024 short-term variable remuneration; as indicated in this Report, the degree of attainment was 128.05% in the case of the CEO and 126.51% in the case of the CRO.

| Director | Initial reference amount (thousand euro) | Adjusted reference amount (thousand euro) | Adjusted reference amount (thousand euro) | Adjusted reference amount (shares) |
|----------|--|---|---|------------------------------------|
| CEO | 856 | (856 x 128.05 %) 1,096 | 493 | 349,484 |
| CRO | 145 | (145 x 126.51%) 184 | 83 | 58,567 |

These amounts are linked to attainment of the long-term objectives defined for the long-term remuneration 2024-2026 as detailed in section 3.1.2.D) and may not, in any event, exceed the indicated amounts.

C.4. Ratio between fixed and variable components

The General Meeting of Shareholders on 10 April 2024 approved the maximum ratio between the executive directors' variable and fixed components at 200%. The proportion of variable to fixed remuneration items for each of the executive directors is shown below.



2.1.2. Contractual conditions for executive directors, including termination indemnities

The executive directors' contractual conditions are described in section 3.1.3.

No executive directors were removed in 2024, with the result that no termination indemnities accrued.

2.1.3. Malus and clawback clauses

As indicated in section 2.1.1 in relation to short- and long-term variable remuneration, up to 100% of outstanding amounts are subject to the possibility of reduction or cancellation (malus clause) and the amounts already paid may have to be repaid (clawback clauses).

The cases that would trigger such clauses are described in section 3.1.2.B); none of them arose in 2024.



2.2 Directors' remuneration for their functions as members of the Board of Directors

Director remuneration is established on the basis of reports on director remuneration in Spain published by KPMG and Spencer Stuart (Spencer Stuart Board Index), which report on the remuneration for membership of the Boards and Committees of Spain's main financial institutions.

In accordance with the power granted to the Board of Directors by the Director Remuneration Policy, and based on the review of the remuneration model and market practices, the Board of Directors was resolved on 31 January 2024 to apply the following annual amounts for remuneration of non-executive directors in 2024:

| | 2024 remuneration (thousand euro) | Attendance fees 2024 (thousand euro per meeting) |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Members | 100 | 2 |
| Additionally: | | |
| Chairman | 1,500 | |
| Deputy Chairman | 107 | |
| Lead Independent Director | 22 | |

Non-executive directors also received the following amounts for membership of Board Committees:

| Committee | Position | Amount (thousand euro) |
|---|----------|------------------------|
| Strategy and Sustainability Committee | Chairman | — |
| | Member | 40 |
| Credit Delegated Committee | Chairman | 70 |
| | Member | 40 |
| Audit and Control Committee | Chairman | 70 |
| | Member | 40 |
| Appointments and Corporate Governance Committee | Chairman | 50 |
| | Member | 30 |
| Remuneration Committee | Chairman | 50 |
| | Member | 30 |
| Risk Committee | Chairman | 70 |
| | Member | 40 |

Based on the foregoing, the total amount actually collected by the members of the Board of Directors in 2024 is as follows (thousand euro):

| Directors | Director category | Board of Directors | Per diems | Board of Directors Committees | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|-------|------|------|------|------|
| | | | | RC | A&CGC | RemC | A&CC | CrDC | S&SC |
| Josep Oliu Creus | Non-executive Chairman | 1600 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pedro Fontana García | Deputy Chairman Independent | 207 | 25 | 0 | 38 | 0 | 10 | 70 | 40 |
| César González-Bueno Mayer Wittgenstein | CEO | 100 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ana Colonques García-Planas | Independent director | 67 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 23 | 0 | 0 |
| Aurora Catá Sala | Independent director | 100 | 25 | 40 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Luis Deulofeu Fuguet | Independent director | 100 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 39 | 37 |
| María José García Beato | Other External Director | 100 | 25 | 0 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 |
| Mireya Giné Torrens | Independent director | 100 | 25 | 0 | 28 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Laura González Molero | Independent director | 100 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 40 | 0 | 0 |
| George Donald Johnston | Lead Independent Director | 122 | 25 | 64 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33 |
| David Martínez Guzmán | Proprietary director | 100 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| José Manuel Martínez Martínez | Independent director | 25 | 7 | 0 | 13 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Alicia Reyes Revuelta | Independent director | 100 | 25 | 37 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 38 | 0 |
| Manuel Valls Morató | Independent director | 100 | 25 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 70 | 0 | 0 |
| David Vegara Figueras | Executive director | 100 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pedro Viñolas Serra | Independent director | 100 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 40 | 0 |

| | |
|------------------|---|
| RC | Risk Committee |
| A&CGC | Appointments and Corporate Governance Committee |
| RemC | Remuneration Committee |
| A&CC | Audit and Control Committee |
| CrDC | Credit Delegated Committee |
| S&SC | Strategy and Sustainability Committee |

Mr. Luis Deulofeu Fuguet collected €30 thousand as an ordinary member of the Board of Directors of Sabadell Digital S.A.U.

Ms. Mireya Giné Torrens collected €30 thousand as an ordinary member of the Board of Directors of Sabadell Consumer Finance, S.A.

The Board of Directors met 15 times in 2024.

The amounts actually received depended on the date of appointment and on meeting attendance, and they are detailed in the Statistical annex to this Report.

The directors did not collect any other additional remuneration from the Institution or any other Group institution in 2024 as consideration for services rendered other than those inherent to their position, or any other remuneration items such as advances, loans or guarantees, or any remuneration by virtue of payments by the Bank to a third party, or any other remuneration not disclosed in this Annual Report on Director Remuneration.



3. Director Remuneration Policy applicable in 2025

Banco Sabadell regularly reflects on its current Director Remuneration Policy, considering the following:

The Bank's actual situation

- **Aligning** remuneration with the short- and long-term objectives set out in the Institution's strategy.
- **Commitment to sustainability:** this is an essential element of the Group's remuneration policy. The components of remuneration contribute to fostering action in environmental, social and governance (ESG) matters in order to make the business strategy sustainable and socially responsible.
- **Prudent risk management:** discouraging the taking of present and future risks that go beyond the level tolerated by the Group, while taking customers' interests into account.
- **Banco Sabadell's Remuneration Policy:** particularly the one applied to members of the Group's Identified Staff and Senior Management.

External factors

- **Regulations:** strict compliance with the regulatory requirements on remuneration.
- **Stakeholders:** recommendations received in the course of Banco Sabadell's regular engagement with investors, shareholders and proxy advisors.
- **Market practices:** credit institutions that may compete for business or talent.
- **Governance:** general corporate governance recommendations at a national and international level.

During the year, based on proposals by the Remuneration Committee, the Board of directors applies the measures it considers to be appropriate in the Director remuneration system within the limits established by the Policy. However, if the Board of Directors considers that the measures to be implemented require an amendment to the policy or a new Remuneration Policy, it may propose such a change or a new Remuneration Policy to the General Meeting of Shareholders.

There are no plans to amend the Director Remuneration Policy in 2025 and, accordingly, the remuneration principles and components defined in the current policy will apply.

3.1. Remuneration for Executive Directors

3.1.1. Remuneration system

In addition to their remuneration for membership of the Board of Directors, executive directors are paid for performing executive functions, as provided in the Articles of Association of Banco Sabadell, under the same headings as members of Banco Sabadell Senior Management and the rest of the Identified Staff.

Executive director remuneration is set each year by the Board of Directors within the maximum overall amount established by the General Meeting of Shareholders by approving the Director Remuneration Policy for each remuneration item. The Board of Directors will comply with the applicable regulations, taking into account its specific status as a financial institution and in line with the items, terms and conditions established in the new Director Remuneration Policy, which takes a comprehensive view of total remuneration including all remuneration components and the relationship between them, striking an appropriate balance between fixed and variable remuneration, as well as between the distribution of short- and long-term payments, while safeguarding the rights and interests of shareholders, investors and customers.

The differences between the remuneration packages for the CEO and CRO are as follows:

- The CRO's remuneration is predominantly fixed in order to reflect the nature of his work and not to jeopardise his independence with respect to the business units he oversees.
- The methods used to set the objectives and determine the variable remuneration take into account each director's specific circumstances; in the specific case of the CRO, they must not jeopardise his objectivity or independence. In this respect, 80% of the Chief Executive Officer's short-term variable remuneration is linked to the Group's objectives and the remaining 20% is based on an individual qualitative appraisal approved by the Remuneration Committee on a motion by the Chairman. Given the functions of the CRO (oversight), the percentage linked to the Group's objectives is limited to 25% and the remaining 75% is indexed to individual objectives: functional objectives (55%) and an individual qualitative assessment (20%).

Each year, in order to establish a remuneration system in line with comparable companies, Banco Sabadell carries out a comparative analysis of the remuneration of the Board of Directors and executive directors in relation to the market, using reports from specialised remuneration consultants.

As indicated in section 2.1. of this Report, domestic and international peer groups, comprising comparable entities in terms of size, sector and market, are defined for these analyses and approved by the Board of Directors.

The result of the domestic benchmark indicates that, in terms of size, the remuneration for Banco Sabadell's CEO should be between the median and the 75th percentile of comparable institutions.

Moreover, the CEO contributes to creating value, since the Group has attained €1.8 billion in attributable net profit, a ROTE of 14.9% and a positive trend in shareholder returns.

As a result of the economic situation, the generation of value resulting from the CEO's management and in the Bank's corporate context, the CEO's remuneration was reviewed in order to bring it into line with market practices.

With regard to the CRO's remuneration, the bank's aspiration is to be positioned between the median and the 75th percentile of domestic financial institutions. In this respect, the CRO's remuneration was below the market median in 2024.

It is worth noting that his performance, experience in the industry and recognition in the regulatory and supervisory area have assisted in the attainment of positive results in risk management, contributing significantly to the Bank's stability and growth.

In recognition of the positive outcome of his function and in order to bring his remuneration into line with market practices and the economic situation, the CRO's remuneration has been reviewed.

The items of executive director remuneration contemplated by the Director Remuneration Policy are summarized below:


| 2025 amounts (thousand euro) | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | CEO | CRO |
| Fixed salary | 2,000 ⁽¹⁾ | 691 |
| Benefits and remuneration in kind | Similar amounts to 2024 | Similar amounts to 2024 |
| Retirement and savings plans | 301 | 132 |
| Short-term variable remuneration | Target*: 1,000 Maximum: 1,440 | Target*: 105 Maximum: 151 |
| Long-term remuneration | Target*: 1,000 Maximum: 1,440 | Target*: 173 Maximum: 249 |

(1) After personal income tax withholdings, the CEO must systematically purchase shares of Banco Sabadell, S.A. for a net annual amount equivalent to €300 thousand gross of his fixed remuneration. Those shares will be under lock-up for a period of five years or until the date of abandoning the Institution, whichever is earlier.

* *Target*: remuneration to be allocated in the event that 100% of the objectives are achieved.


Maximum: maximum amount of the variable remuneration to be allocated in the event of exceeding the objectives.

Accordingly, the proportion between an executive director's fixed and variable remuneration, assuming attainment of the objectives and a maximum attainment scenario, is as follows:



- Fixed salary + benefits + pension benefits
- Short-term variable remuneration + discretionary pension benefits
- Long-term remuneration


Scheme for payment of short-term variable remuneration



Performance year
Year "n"

- In shares
- In cash

Scheme for payment of long-term variable remuneration



3.1.2. Details of the remuneration items

In accordance with the Director Remuneration Policy, the Board of Directors is empowered, on the motion of the Remuneration Committee, to set the amounts of annual fixed and variable remuneration for each of the executive directors within the maximum established amounts.

A. Fixed remuneration

In accordance with the Director Remuneration Policy, the maximum combined amount of fixed remuneration for executive directors is €6 million per year: Within that limit, which includes fixed annual remuneration in cash and in shares as well as benefits and retirement and long-term savings plans as specified by contract, the Board of Directors sets the individual

remuneration amounts based on a favourable report by the Remuneration Committee.

The individual remuneration amounts comprising the fixed remuneration of the executive directors under the new Policy are listed below:

| Description | Additional information | Amount (thousand euro) |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| Fixed salary | Paid monthly in cash. This remuneration is set by the Board of Directors on the motion of the Remuneration Committee. | — CEO: 2,000 ⁽¹⁾ — CRO: 691 |
| Benefits and remuneration in kind | In 2025, the executive directors are beneficiaries of, inter alia, a group life insurance policy, school aid and Christmas hamper (as applicable to all the Bank's employees) and a medical insurance policy and risk coverage (also applicable to the Bank's management team), and they have the use of a vehicle on the same terms as the other members of Senior Management. | — CEO: Similar amounts to 2024 ⁽²⁾ — CRO: Similar amounts to 2024 ⁽²⁾ |
| Pension plan | Like all other employees, the executive directors are members of the B Group defined contribution occupational pension plan, which pays out on retirement as an employee. | — CEO: 1 — CRO: 1 |
| Retirement and savings plans* | The CEO is the beneficiary of a defined-contribution group savings insurance policy that pays out upon termination of the contract, death or absolute permanent disability, conditional upon diligent performance in his capacity as CEO. The CRO is a beneficiary of a defined contribution executive group insurance policy which will pay out in the event of effective retirement, death or permanent and absolute disability, except where, in the absence of express interest on the part of Banco Sabadell, the executive continues to work at Banco Sabadell beyond the age defined by law for collecting retirement benefit, in which case all economic rights are forfeited. Both policies allow for the benefit to be received as a lump sum, an annuity or a combination of the two, in accordance with current legislation. The plans are compatible with termination indemnities. | — CEO: 300 — CRO: 131 |

(*) Discretionary pension benefits: from the entry into force of Bank of Spain Circular 2/2016, of 2 February, to credit institutions, on supervision and capital adequacy, which completes the adaptation of Spanish law to Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) 575/2013, 15% of contributions are treated as discretionary pension benefits and, consequently, are linked to the percentage attainment of the beneficiary's short-term objectives, capped at 100% of the amount.


Consequently, 15% of the contributions to be made in 2025 in relation to the group executive insurance policy on behalf of the CEO and CRO will be adjusted on the basis of the degree of attainment of the short-term variable remuneration objectives.

(1) Of that amount, €300 thousand must be systematically invested in shares of Banco de Sabadell, S.A., which must be retained for five years or until the date he leaves the Institution, if earlier.

(2) The amounts in 2024 are detailed in section 7. Statistical annex, table i).

B. 2025 Short-term variable remuneration

The Director Remuneration Policy establishes that short-term variable remuneration is calculated as follows:



B.1. Target and maximum amounts

| Description | Additional information | CEO Amount (thousand euro) | CRO Amount (thousand euro) |
|----------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------------|
| Short-term variable remuneration | Reflect performance in the year, measured through annual objectives aligned with the risk incurred. The executive directors are assigned Group objectives, which include risk control and management metrics, and capital metrics, and may also have strategic objectives, with a weighting assigned to each indicator, and a scale of attainment. The objectives assigned to each executive director for 2025 are set out in this section 3.1.2.B). | Target: 1,000 Maximum: 1,440 | Target: 105 Maximum: 151 |

B.2. Objectives and metrics

The breakdown of the objectives for 2025 is as follows:

| | CEO | CRO |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Group annual objectives | 80% | 25% |
| Functional objectives | — | 55% |
| Individual qualitative assessment | 20% | 20% |
| Total | 100% | 100% |

| Group objectives 2025 | The indicators for 2025 are the same as in 2024, aligned with the strategic priorities defined by the Bank. | |
|--|---|--|
| Metrics selected for the Group objectives | | |
| Objective | Weighting | Description |
| ROTE | 15.0% | Return on tangible equity. |
| Group net profit | 10.0% | Profit that is directly attributable to the parent company, calculated by deducting minority interests from profit for the year. |
| Net interest income + Net fees and commissions | 15.0% | Banco Sabadell Group consolidated net interest income plus net fees and commissions in 2025. |
| Group expenses + Depreciation & amortization | 10.0% | Personnel expenses + General expenses + Depreciation + Amortisation + Recovery costs |
| Asset quality | 15.0% | Cost of Risk (5 %) + NPA volume (5 %) + Coverage ratio (5 %). |
| Market share | 10.0% | A synthetic indicator focused on increasing profitability and revenue. it is composed of indicators of market share of loans and advances in Spain, market share of mortgages in the United Kingdom through subsidiary TSB, and market share of net fees and commissions with respect to credit institutions operating in Spain. |
| Service quality | 15.0% | A synthetic indicator that reflects the rating of quality of service by the Group's customers, distinguishing between commercial segments and relationship channels and employee satisfaction index. |
| Sustainability | 10.0% | A synthetic valuation indicator comprising metrics linked to sustainable business (green and sustainability-linked financing), diversity (% female executives), upgrades by the main rating agencies/ESG indices and Sustainable Finance Plan. |

CEO objectives

In the case of the CEO, 80% of the objectives are linked to the Group's objectives and the other 20% depend on an individual qualitative assessment adopted by the Remuneration Committee on the motion of the Chairman.

CRO objectives

In the case of the CRO, 25% of the objectives are linked to the Group's objectives and the other 75% is indexed to individual objectives that, in turn, are composed of functional objectives (55%) and an individual qualitative assessment (20%). These functional objectives are aligned with the oversight functions he performs, independent of the business and corporate areas, and are focused on the oversight and monitoring of transactions and of the risks that arise from such transactions, ensuring compliance with applicable laws, rules and regulations, and advising management on matters in his area of expertise.

In this regard, the functional objectives set for the CRO for 2025 revolve around the following parameters:

Quantitative objectives:

- Improvement in the SREP score, weighted 20% of his functional objectives.
- Management satisfaction, weighted 10% of his functional objectives.

Qualitative objectives:

- Contribution to the performance of the Risk Committee, weighted 20%.
- Fulfilment of the annual plans of action for the second line of defence (2LoD), weighted 25%.
- Deployment of a model control framework for artificial intelligence (AI), with a 10% weighting.
- Development and implementation of an annual regulatory model plan, weighted 7.5%.
- Contribution to the delivery of the stress test exercise, with a weighting of 7.5%.

30% of the CRO's functional objectives are quantitative and the other 70% relate to qualitative assessments made by the Risk Committee.

B.3. Attainment scale

Regarding the Group objectives, which are applied as functional objectives for the CEO, attainment parameters have been set between 50% and 150% for each of the objectives, based on a non-linear scale of attainment established beforehand by the Remuneration Committee for each objective. Attainment of under 50% is considered as 0% for the purposes of counting overall attainment.

In the case of the CRO's functional objectives, the attainment parameters are set between 50% and 150%.

In the qualitative assessment, attainment is capped at 120%.

In order to qualify for variable remuneration, overall attainment of the objectives must exceed 60%. No variable remuneration is accrued under 60%, and no additional variable remuneration is accrued above 144%.

B.4. Prudential adjustments for attainment of objectives

The amount to be actually received will be determined by the degree of attainment of the established Group objectives, adjusted by a correction factor based on the relationship between the Institution's capital (CET1 and MREL) and liquidity (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) and the limits set in the Risk Appetite Statement (RAS). Failure by any of these indicators to reach the objective will entail a reduction in variable remuneration; breach of the tolerance threshold for these indicators in the RAS will count as failure to attain the Group objectives for 2025.

In addition, there are prudential mechanisms for adjusting the CRO's individual attainment, based on exceedance of expected loss thresholds in terms of operational risk and/or internal control indicators.



B.5. Ex-ante risk adjustments

The amount of any short-term remuneration item is subject to downward adjustment at the discretion of Board of Directors, on a motion by the Remuneration Committee, and may even be reduced to zero, depending on the following parameters:

- An adjustment to variable remuneration based on risk profile and earnings performance. The adjustment may be applied at Group, unit, country or even individual level, to reflect the various classes of risk. This variable remuneration adjustment, which can reduce the initial pool of available remuneration to zero, ensures that the variable remuneration is fully aligned with the risks assumed. The variable remuneration adjustment will cover all the cases or situations that might have an impact on the Group's risk profile and that were not fully factored into the assessment of the objectives set at the beginning of the year, and will be related to risk and control factors such as breaches of standards and regulations, exceedance of risk limits (e.g. RAS [capital, liquidity] or exceedance of expected loss thresholds in terms of operational risk) and/or internal control indicators (e.g. results of internal audits) or similar items.
- The possibility of reduction to zero if the Bank's capital is less than the Maximum Distributable Amount (MDA) determined by regulation at any given time.

B.6. Malus and clawback clauses

Short-term variable remuneration and long-term remuneration that has not yet been collected (up to 100% of the amount) may be reduced or cancelled (malus clause) or clawed back in the event of poor financial performance by the Bank as a whole or by a specific division or area or by the exposures generated by the executive director in question. They will also apply in the event of actions or omissions by the executive director to whom they are applicable that are in breach of the applicable regulations or the internal rules of the Company or that are otherwise irregular. It is not necessary for there to be malice or negligence in order for these clauses to apply. For these purposes, the performance assessment will be compared with subsequent performance of the variables that contributed to achieving the objectives.

The following factors will be considered:

- Significant failures in risk management by the Institution or a business unit.
- An increase in capital requirements at the Institution or one of its business units not envisaged at the time that the exposure was generated.
- Regulatory penalties or legal convictions for events attributable to the unit or its managers. Failure to comply with the Institution's internal codes of conduct.
- Improper conduct, whether individual or collective. Particular consideration will be given to the negative effects deriving from marketing unsuitable products and the liability of the persons or bodies making such decisions.

Malus clauses may be triggered during the period in which variable remuneration is deferred. Clawback clauses may be triggered from the time the remuneration is paid up to conclusion of the corresponding lock-up period. Application of clawback clauses may be supplementary to the application of malus causes so that, in addition to forfeiting amounts not yet received, the executive director may be required to refund part or all of the amounts already received as short-term variable remuneration or long-term remuneration.


The Remuneration Committee must review the situation each year in order to make a proposal to the Board of Directors, if necessary, based on a report by the People and Sustainability Division, and after seeking the opinion of the Internal Control Division, the Finance Division and the Compliance Division as to whether circumstances have arisen to reduce or cancel the deferred remuneration or trigger clawback of variable remuneration already collected by an executive director, depending on the characteristics and circumstances of each particular case.

B.7. Payment procedure

This remuneration is deferred and paid in equity instruments, in accordance with the applicable regulations.

Accordingly, actual receipt of the executive directors' short-term variable remuneration for 2025 will be subject to the following scheme:

2025 variable remuneration



40% of the variable remuneration for 2025 will be paid in 2026, split 50% in cash and 50% in Banco Sabadell shares (valued at the closing market price in the last trading session in the month in 2026 when it is paid), the shares being subject to a lock-up of at least one year.*

60% of the variable remuneration for 2025 will be deferred over a five-year period, with one-fifth being paid in each of the years 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030 and 2031, split 45% in cash and 55% in Banco Sabadell shares (the number being determined on the basis of the closing market price in the last trading session in the month in 2026 when they are delivered).

* Variable remuneration paid in shares is subject to lock-up of at least one year. In line with recommendation 62 of the Code of Good Governance, unless executive directors own shares amounting to the equivalent of twice their fixed annual remuneration, they may not dispose of the shares they receive until at least three years have elapsed from the time of delivery. The above condition will not apply to any shares that the director must dispose of to cover tax obligations related to their delivery.

The use of personal hedging strategies or any mechanism that guarantees receipt of part or all of the variable remuneration is not permitted.

C. Long-term remuneration 2025-2027

Executive directors receive long-term remuneration granted each year in overlapping cycles.

The long-term remuneration scheme for 2025-2027 is based on the attainment of annual and multi-year objectives (3 years), where a reference amount of long-term remuneration (amount to be received in the event of 100% attainment of both annual and multi-year objectives) is established at the beginning of the cycle. The reference amount for the period 2025-2027 is €1,000 thousand for the CEO and €173 thousand for the CRO.

After the first year of the cycle has concluded, the reference amount is adjusted during the first quarter based on the following factors:

- Degree of attainment of the objectives for short-term variable remuneration in the first year of the cycle.
- Ex-ante adjustments, if any.

This adjustment may result in the reference amount being zero or, in the event of overachievement of annual objectives, at most 144% of the reference amount in the case of both directors.

Payment of the adjusted reference amount, determined as a cash amount (45%) and a number of shares (55%), will depend on the degree of attainment of the multi-year objectives (period of three years). The final amount to be paid may not exceed the adjusted reference amount (which may not be increased in any event).

Additionally, as in the case of annual objectives, a risk-related correction factor will be applied that includes indicators relating to capital (CET1 and MREL) and liquidity (Liquidity Coverage Ratio), and an attainment

adjustment. Breach of the tolerance threshold in the RAS for liquidity or capital adequacy result in the long-term remuneration being reduced to zero.

C.1.) Target and maximum amounts

| Description | Additional information | CEO amount (thousand euro) | CRO (thousand euro) |
|------------------------|---|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| Long-term remuneration | Measure the Group's and the executive director's performance over a multi-year time-scale. | Target: 1,000 | Target: 173 |
| | The annual objectives determine the amount assigned, to the same extent as in the case of short-term variable remuneration. Based on that amount, the multi-year objectives determine the amount to be actually received, which may be less (but never more) than the amount assigned on the basis of annual objectives. The objectives assigned to each executive director for the various cycles that are current in 2025 are set out in section 3.1.2.C). | Maximum: 1,440 | Maximum: 249 |

C.2.) Objectives and metrics

The same objectives as for short-term variable remuneration are applicable to determine the adjusted reference amount.

The indicators for the multi-year objectives for the period 2025-2027 are detailed below.

| Objective | 2025-2027 |
|----------------------------------|-----------|
| Total Shareholder Return (TSR) | 40% |
| Return on Tangible Equity (ROTE) | 40% |
| Sustainability | 20% |

The main features of each of those metrics are described below:

Relative Total Shareholder Return (Relative TSR)

Definition:

TSR is taken to be the sum of the dividends paid and the share price appreciation, taken as the difference between the arithmetic mean of the closing price of the share, rounded to the third decimal place, in the 20 sessions preceding the beginning date and the last 20 sessions of the years in which the end date falls. For these purposes, the beginning and end dates are as follows:

| Long-term remuneration | 2025-2027 |
|------------------------|------------------|
| Beginning date | 1 January 2025 |
| End date | 31 December 2027 |

In order to apply market best practices and in line with the recommendations received in the Bank's regular engagement with investors, shareholders and proxy advisors, the improvements introduced in 2024 to calculate attainment of the TSR indicator have been maintained:

- The maximum level of attainment is 135%.
- Attainment of more than 100% requires that the TSR exceed the median.
- Any position in the last quartile entails 0% attainment.

Banco Sabadell's TSR will be compared with that of the following peer group:

| Peer group | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| ABN AMRO Group NV | Caixabank S.A. | Mediobanca |
| Banco Bpm SpA | Commerzbank AG | Raiffeisen |
| Bankinter S.A. | Erste Group | Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB |
| BBVA, S.A. | Intesa Sanpaolo SpA | Standard Chartered Bank |
| BPER Banca, SpA | KBC Groep NV | Swedbank AB |

To ensure that the comparison is made on a like-for-like basis, the Board of Directors has the power, based on a proposal from the Remuneration Committee, to adapt, where appropriate, the composition of the sample of entities in the event of unforeseen circumstances affecting the aforementioned companies (e.g. mergers, spin-offs, delisting, etc.) and to adapt the TSR calculation for any transactions (e.g. rights issues) by those entities that affect the value of the shares.

Attainment scale

Banco Sabadell's TSR ranking within the peer group

Long-term remuneration

| 2025 | % |
|---------------------|------|
| #1 | 135% |
| #2 | 129% |
| #3 | 124% |
| #4 | 118% |
| #5 | 112% |
| #6 | 106% |
| #7 | 101% |
| #8 | 95% |
| #9 | 84% |
| #10 | 73% |
| #11 | 61% |
| #12 | 50% |
| Between #13 and #16 | 0% |

Return on Tangible Equity (ROTE)

Definition:

ROTE is determined as the average of the values obtained in December during the measurement period (2025-2027).

Attainment scale:

The following attainment scale is defined:

| 0% | 50% | 100% | 150% |
|------|------|-----------|------|
| <13% | >13% | 14% - 15% | >15% |

Attainment is increased on a straight-line basis for attainment between 50% and 100% and between 100% and 150%.

Sustainability


Definition:

A synthetic indicator related to sustainable business (green finance, sustainability-linked finance, and other finance) and Diversity (% women in the management team).

Attainment scale:

An attainment scale is defined for the Sustainable Business indicator based on accumulated objectives for 2025-2027 and another scale is defined for the % of Women in the management team.

C.3.) Proportion of total variable remuneration with respect to target metrics



D) Long-term remuneration 2023-2025 and 2024-2026.

The indicators of the long-term remuneration plans in force and covering the year 2025, which, like the one corresponding to the period 2025-2027, are based on the attainment of annual and multi-year (3 years) objectives, where a reference amount for the long-term remuneration (amount to be received in the event of 100% attainment of both annual and multi-year objectives) is established at the beginning of the cycle, are summarized below.

The amounts established for each of these two plans are detailed in 2.1.1.C).

| Objective | 2023-2025 | 2024-2026 |
|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Total Shareholder Return (TSR) | 40% | 40% |
| Return on Tangible Equity (ROTE) | 40% | 40% |
| Sustainability | 20% | 20% |

Relative Total Shareholder Return (Relative TSR)

Definition:

TSR is taken to be the sum of the dividends paid and the share price appreciation, taken as the difference between the arithmetic mean of the closing price of the share, rounded to the third decimal place, in the 20 sessions preceding the beginning date and the last 20 sessions of the years in which the end date falls. For these purposes, the beginning and end dates are as follows:

| Long-term remuneration | 2023-2025 | 2024-2026 |
|------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Beginning date | 1 January 2023 | 1 January 2024 |
| End date | 31 December 2025 | 31 December 2026 |

Banco Sabadell's TSR will be compared with that of the following peer group in both plans:

| Peer group | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| ABN AMRO Group NV | Caixabank S.A. | Raiffeisen |
| Banco Bpm SpA | Erste Group | Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB |
| Bankinter S.A. | Intesa Sanpaolo SpA | Standard Chartered Bank |
| BBVA, S.A. | KBC Groep NV | Swedbank AB |
| BPER Banca, SpA | Mediobanca | Virgin Money |



Attainment scale

Banco Sabadell's TSR ranking within the peer group

| Long-term remuneration | | | |
|------------------------|------|---------------------|------|
| 2023-2025 | % | 2024-2026 | % |
| #1 | 150% | #1 | 135% |
| #2 | 143% | #2 | 129% |
| #3 | 136% | #3 | 124% |
| #4 | 129% | #4 | 118% |
| #5 | 121% | #5 | 112% |
| #6 | 114% | #6 | 106% |
| #7 | 107% | #7 | 101% |
| #8 | 100% | #8 | 95% |
| #9 | 88% | #9 | 84% |
| #10 | 75% | #10 | 73% |
| #11 | 63% | #11 | 61% |
| #12 | 50% | #12 | 50% |
| #13 | 30% | | |
| Between #14 and #16 | 0% | Between #13 and #16 | 0% |

Return on Tangible Equity (ROTE) for both plans

Definition:

ROTE in each plan is determined as the average of the values obtained in the month of December during the measurement period (2023-2025 and 2024-2026).

Attainment scale:

The following attainment scale is defined:

| 2023-2025 | 0% | 50% | 100% | 150% |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----------|------|
| | <8% | >8% | 10% - 12% | >15% |

| 2024-2026 | 0% | 50% | 100% | 150% |
|-----------|------|------|-----------|------|
| | <11% | >11% | 12% - 13% | >14% |

Attainment is increased on a straight-line basis for attainment between 50% and 100% and between 100% and 150%.

Sustainability (set for 2023-2025)

Definition:

A synthetic indicator related to the Sustainable Business (sustainable finance, social finance, sustainability-linked finance, and other finance) and Diversity (% women in the management team).

Attainment scale:

An attainment scale is defined for the Sustainable Finance indicator based on accumulated objectives for 2023-2025 and another scale is defined for the percentage of women in the management team.

Sustainability (set for 2024-2026)

Definition:

A synthetic indicator related to the Sustainable Business (FAS finance, sustainable finance, and other finance) and Diversity (% women in the management team).

Attainment scale:

An attainment scale is defined for the Environment indicator based on accumulated objectives for 2024-2026 and another scale is defined for the % of Women in the management team.

D.1.) Prudential adjustments for attainment of objectives

A risk-related correction factor will be applied that includes indicators relating to capital (CET1 and MREL) and liquidity (Liquidity Coverage Ratio), and attainment adjustments. Breach of the tolerance threshold in the RAS for liquidity or capital adequacy result in the long-term remuneration being reduced to zero.

D.2.) Ex-ante risk adjustments

The ex-ante risk adjustments described in section 3.1.2.B) for short-term variable remuneration are also applicable to long-term remuneration.

D.3.) Payment procedure

This remuneration is deferred and paid in equity instruments, in accordance with the applicable regulations and the Remuneration Policy. The following table shows the calendar for payment of the long-term remuneration for 2023, 2024 and 2025:

| Long-term remuneration | Measurement year | Multi-year measurement period | 1st payment* (60%) | 2nd payment* (20%) | 3rd payment* (20%) |
|------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| 2023 | 2023 | 2023 2025 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
| 2024 | 2024 | 2024 2026 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
| 2025 | 2025 | 2025 2027 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 |

* Since the adjusted reference amount is determined 45% in cash and the remaining 55% in Banco Sabadell shares, each payment of the long-term remuneration will be made in the same proportion. The shares that are delivered are subject to lock-up as described in section 3.1.2.B) on short-term variable remuneration.

3.1.3. Contractual conditions for executive directors, including termination indemnities

The executive directors' contracts are standard Senior Management contracts and meet the legal requirements for contracts of this type, with the following terms and conditions:

- **Duration:** the contracts are indefinite.
- **Fixed remuneration:** the contracts provide for the payment of fixed remuneration to executive directors under the terms and conditions detailed above.
- **Variable remuneration:** the contracts provide for the payment of variable remuneration to executive directors under the terms and conditions detailed above.
- **Retirement and savings plans:** the contracts provide for executive directors to participate in pension and saving schemes, under the terms and conditions detailed above.
- **Benefits:** the executive directors' contracts provide for them to enjoy the benefits and flexible remuneration schemes that the Bank has established for its other employees, in the same terms as the latter.
- **Confidentiality:** the contracts include a confidentiality clause that obliges directors not to disclose, either during the term of the contract or thereafter, any confidential data, procedures, methods, information, or commercial or industrial data referring to the Bank's business or finances.
- **Restitution and use of company assets:** all material goods, information media, files, documentation, manuals, etc. that the directors have in their possession must be returned to the Bank at the time of termination of the contract.
- **Clawback and Malus clauses:** the contracts contain clauses of both types that apply in the cases defined in the Director Remuneration Policy, as described in section 3.1.2.B).
- **Early termination and non-competition:** The Chief Executive Officer's contract contains a post-contractual non-competition clause of two years' duration providing two years' fixed remuneration, including the portion of annual contributions to pension plans that are not classified as discretionary pension benefits, in the event of the Chief Executive Officer's termination due to (i) a decision by the Bank, without this being due to a breach of the Chief Executive Officer's duties, or (ii) a change of control; and a non-competition clause of one year's fixed remuneration and one year's duration for all other cases. The application of this non-competition clause is limited geographically to Spain, the United Kingdom and Mexico, where the Bank's main activity is concentrated. The CRO's contract contains a post-contractual non-competition clause with a duration of two years, applicable at most up to the first date of ordinary retirement, providing for two years' fixed remuneration.

They do not contain any of the other clauses set out in article 249.4 in connection with article 529.1 *octodecies* of the Capital Companies Law.

3.2. Remuneration for Directors for their functions as members of the Board of Directors

3.2.1. Remuneration Policy

In accordance with the Director Remuneration Policy applicable in 2025, the overall maximum limit of remuneration for directors for their duties as members of the Board of Directors, pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Association of Banco Sabadell, is €5 million per year. This maximum limit includes the additional remuneration for the Chairman for non-executive functions. The remuneration is set each year within this limit by the Board of Directors subject to a favourable report from the Remuneration Committee.

Board of Directors remuneration for 2025 is determined on the basis of the reports on director remuneration in Spain compiled by Spencer Stuart and the report entitled “La remuneración de los consejeros de las sociedades cotizadas” (The remuneration of directors of listed companies) produced by consulting firm KPMG.

Directors' remuneration in 2025 for membership of the Board of Directors is broken down as follows:

- Fixed remuneration for belonging to the Board of Directors.
- Attendance fees, for at most 11 ordinary meetings, with the possibility of collecting attendance fees for at most two meetings that they miss for justified reasons provided that they grant proxy in those cases. No amounts are payable for attendance at extraordinary meetings of the Board of Directors.
- The Chairman receives additional fixed remuneration for performing his duties as Chairman of the Bank, of the Board of Directors and of the General Meeting of Shareholders, for acting as the Bank's highest representative, and for the special dedication involved in performing the duties of Chairman under the terms established in the Capital Companies Law, in the Articles of Association and by the Board of Directors in a group such as Banco Sabadell. Due to the organic or representative nature of these functions, they cannot be classified as executive functions but they require a considerable degree of dedication of a much greater intensity than that of the other non-executive members of the Board of Directors.
- Additional amounts for performing the functions of Deputy Chairman or Lead Independent Director, and for chairing or being a member of Board Committees.

Non-executive directors do not qualify for the remuneration or benefits that apply to Bank personnel, the Group's Identified Staff or Senior Management, and they are not members of the retirement and savings or variable and long-term remuneration systems.

3.2.2. Projected remuneration

In accordance with the power granted to the Board of Directors by the Director Remuneration Policy, and based on the review of the remuneration model and the amounts for the Board and its Committees in relation to market practices, the remuneration specified in the following table was approved on 31 January 2025:

| | 2024 remuneration (thousand euro) | Attendance fees 2024 (thousand euro per meeting) |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Members | 100 | 2 |
| Additionally: | | |
| Chairman | 1,500 | |
| Deputy Chairman | 107 | |
| Lead Independent Director | 22 | |

Non-executive directors also receive remuneration for chairing or being members of Board Committees.

| Committee | Position | Amount (thousand euro) |
|---|----------|------------------------|
| Strategy and Sustainability Committee | Chairman | — |
| | Member | 40 |
| Credit Delegated Committee | Chairman | 70 |
| | Member | 40 |
| Audit and Control Committee | Chairman | 70 |
| | Member | 40 |
| Appointments and Corporate Governance Committee | Chairman | 50 |
| | Member | 30 |
| Remuneration Committee | Chairman | 50 |
| | Member | 30 |
| Risk Committee | Chairman | 70 |
| | Member | 40 |

Mr. Luis Deulofeu Fuguet will collect at most €30,000 as an ordinary member of the Board of Directors of Sabadell Digital S.A.U.

Ms. Mireya Giné Torrens will collect €30,000 as an ordinary member of the Board of Directors of Sabadell Consumer Finance, S.A.

It is not envisaged that the non-executive directors will collect any other supplementary remuneration from the Institution or any other Group institution in 2025 as consideration for services rendered other than those inherent to their position, or any other remuneration items such as advances, loans or guarantees, or any other additional remuneration not disclosed in this Annual Report on Director Remuneration.

Both Mr. Josep Olliu Creus, the Chairman, and Ms. María José García Beato, a director, will continue to receive the deferred amounts of short- and long-term variable remuneration accrued wholly or partly while they performed executive duties.

3.2.3. Contractual conditions

With the exception of the Chairman, non-executive directors are not under contract to the Bank by virtue of their status as members of the Board of Directors, and none of them are entitled to indemnities or have non-compete clauses for the event of termination of their position as director.

As established in the Articles of Association of Banco de Sabadell, S.A., the Chairman is the highest representative of the Bank and has the rights and obligations inherent to that position, including the power to sign on behalf of the company. In discharging his duties, the Chairman of the Board of Directors is the person with primary responsibility for the effectiveness of the Board of Directors and, as such, represents the Bank in any event, and signs on behalf of the company; he convenes and chairs meetings of the Board of Directors, setting the agenda, directing the debates and deliberations within the Board of Directors, and taking responsibility for executing the decisions adopted by the Board of Directors.

Due to the scope and special nature of his duties, the Chairman's contract as a non-executive director provides for fixed remuneration in addition to that corresponding to his membership of the Board.





4. Procedures and bodies involved in determining and approving the Remuneration Policy

4.1. General framework

The Articles of Association of Banco Sabadell set out the competencies of the Board of Directors and its Committees. The Board of Directors Regulation sets out the terms of reference for the Board of Directors and its Committees, establishing their powers and basic rules of functioning and organization, in line with the regulations applicable to listed companies and credit institutions, as implemented and complemented in the terms of reference of the Board Committees. The Articles of Association and the Regulation of the Board of Directors of Banco Sabadell and of its Committees are available on the Banco Sabadell corporate website.

In accordance with the provisions of the Capital Companies Law, the Board of Directors is vested with the non-delegable power to determine the company's general policies and strategies and to make decisions regarding the remuneration of the Directors, within the framework of the Articles of Association and of any Director Remuneration Policy.

The Remuneration Committee is entrusted with making proposals to the Board of Directors regarding the Director Remuneration Policy and the individual remuneration and other contractual conditions of the executive directors, and with overseeing compliance, in accordance with the Regulation of the Board of Directors and of the committee itself.

The Remuneration Committee also has at least the following basic responsibilities as set out in article 18 of the Regulation of the Board of Directors and elaborated upon in the Regulation of the Remuneration Committee:

- a) Proposing the Director Remuneration Policy to the Board of Directors.
- b) Proposing, to the Board of Directors, the Remuneration Policy for general managers and others performing Senior Management functions who report directly to the Board of Directors, the Delegated Committee or the CEOs, and the individual remuneration and other contractual conditions for executive directors, exercising oversight to ensure that they are complied with.
- c) Regularly reviewing Remuneration Policy.
- d) Advising on remuneration programmes based on shares and/or options.
- e) Periodically reviewing the general principles of remuneration and the remuneration programmes for all employees, and considering whether they conform to those principles.
- f) Ensuring transparency of remuneration.
- g) Ensuring that potential conflicts of interest do not impair the independence of external advice.
- h) Verifying the information on remuneration contained in the various corporate documents, including the Report on Director Remuneration.

The Remuneration Committee complies with the principles, good practices and criteria for its proper functioning established by Technical

Guide 1/2019 on appointments and remuneration Committees, dated February 20, published by the Spanish National Securities Market Commission.

In accordance with the provisions of article 67 of the Articles of Association, at the end of 2023 Banco Sabadell's Remuneration Committee comprised four non-executive directors, all of whom are independent directors, as follows:

Composition:

Chairman

Ms. Mireya Giné Torrens

Members

Ms. Ana Colonques García-Planas

Ms. Laura González Molero

Non-member secretary

Mr. Gonzalo Barettino Coloma

In accordance with Article 19 of the Board Regulation and with its own terms of reference, the Risk Committee is responsible for informing the Remuneration Committee as to whether the employee remuneration programmes are coherent with the Group's risk, capital and liquidity.

In accordance with Article 16 of the Board Regulation and with its own terms of reference, the Audit and Control Committee supervises the process of drafting and presenting the regulated financial and non-financial information, including that related to remuneration, checking compliance with the law and the correct application of accounting standards. In particular, an annual audit of the Remuneration Policy is performed whose conclusions are submitted to the Remuneration Committee.

Proposals by the Remuneration Committee are submitted to the Board of Directors for consideration and, where appropriate, approval.

In accordance with the Director Remuneration Policy in force and within the limits established therein, on 31 January 2025 the Board of Directors determined the amount of remuneration for directors for the current financial year. Specifically, it determined the remuneration corresponding to the Chairman during the year and that of the other Directors in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors. It also determined the remuneration corresponding to the executive directors for performance of executive functions, as detailed in the related sections above.

Several divisions of the Bank participate in the application and oversight of the Remuneration Policy. They include the People and Sustainability Division, which produces an annual report on remuneration whose purpose is to provide the Remuneration Committee with basic information to enable it to perform the functions entrusted to it in connection with the review of the general principles of the Banco Sabadell Remuneration Policy and oversight of the remuneration for executive directors, Senior Management and the other persons who, because of their responsibility, risk-taking capacity and remuneration status, form part of the Group's Identified Staff, in accordance with the provisions of Law 10/2014 and Delegated Regulation 923/2021/EU.

4.2. Remuneration benchmarking and external advisers

In addition to the assistance of the Bank's divisions, the Remuneration Committee obtains advice from the specialized firm Willis Towers Watson, which assists the Committee in identifying market trends and regulatory developments in connection with remuneration; it also consults with EY People Advisory Services, a firm that is specialized in the implementation of integrated business strategies. Specialized consulting firm Mercer Consulting S.L. issued an independent assessment on the implementation of the Remuneration Policy that is applicable to the members of the Identified Staff and on the Director Remuneration Policy; it concluded that the policies were being applied properly; that report was submitted to the Risk Committee and the Remuneration Committee in January 2025.

Additionally, with a view to establishing a Remuneration Policy that is consistent with comparable companies, each year Banco Sabadell uses the Spencer Stuart Board Index 2023 and the report entitled "La remuneración de los consejeros de las sociedades cotizadas" (The remuneration of directors of listed companies) produced by consulting firm KPMG, as well as advice from consulting firm Willis Towers Watson, to perform a comparative analysis of the remuneration for the Board of Directors, members of Senior Management and other members of the Identified Staff with respect to the market.


The remuneration for the CEO for 2025 was benchmarked against two groups of companies. As detailed in the following table, the first peer group is composed of 15 banks from Spain and other European countries (the international benchmark), while the second peer group is made up of 15 Spanish companies, most of them in the IBEX-35 (the domestic benchmark).

The CEO's total remuneration for 2025 is in the 71st percentile of the international peer group and the 75th percentile of the domestic peer group.

Companies used as benchmark

| Banks in the international benchmark | | Companies in the domestic benchmark | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| ABN Amro Group | Intesa San Paolo | Abanca | Ferrovial |
| Banco BPM | KBC Groep NV | Acciona | Fluidra |
| Bankinter | Mediobanca | Amadeus | Grifols |
| BBVA | Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken | Bankinter | Mapfre |
| BPER Banca | Standard Chartered Bank | BBVA | Merlin Properties |
| Caixabank | Raiffeisen | Caixabank | Santander Spain |
| Commerzbank AG | Swedbank | Enagás | Siemens Gamesa |
| Erste Group | | Endesa | |

The CRO's remuneration was established on the basis of information on comparable positions in the group of European and Spanish companies indicated above, and it is above the 60th percentile of the domestic peer group.



5. Measures to reduce exposure to excessive risks and contribute to sustainable performance

The Banco Sabadell Remuneration Policy is aligned with the shareholders' interests, the Banco Sabadell Group strategy and the creation of long-term value, while promoting appropriate risk management.

Without prejudice to the oversight exercised by the Bank's Board of Directors and its Committees and the Bank's divisions (described in section 4 of this Report), the Director Remuneration Policy incorporates a number of elements that reduce exposure to excessive risk-taking, many of which were described above. Those elements also apply to professionals who have a material impact on the Bank's risk profile (the Identified Staff).

The main elements of the Remuneration Policy that reduce exposure to excessive risk-taking and align remuneration with the Bank's objectives, values and long-term interests are listed below.

Objectives established in variable remuneration

The Group's corporate objectives established with respect to short-term variable remuneration in 2024 and 2025 measure the Bank's prudential performance from both a financial and non-financial perspective. In this regard, 65% of the objectives are linked to financial metrics related to profitability (ROTE), results (net profit, net interest income plus fees and commissions), expense control (Group expenses), and asset quality (cost of risk, NPA volume, % coverage). The remaining 20% is linked to non-financial parameters that are fundamental to value creation by the Group, such as the availability of the Group's customer services and employee satisfaction (quality of service) and the improvement in its scores in the main ESG indexes, the sustainable finance plan, diversity and environment (Sustainability), and the market share target.

In addition, taking into account the functions performed by the CRO, in accordance with the regulations applicable to credit institutions, it has been established that the Group's objectives should be limited to 25% in his particular case, leaving the remaining 75% linked to individual objectives in 2025.

In long-term remuneration, it is necessary to meet not only the annual objectives established for short-term variable remuneration but also the multi-year objectives linked to the creation of shareholder value (relative TSR), profitability (ROTE) and sustainability (synthetic ESG indicator).

Adjustments for attainment of objectives

As discussed above, both short-term and long-term remuneration are subject to a risk-related correction factor that includes indicators relating to capital (CET1 and MREL) and liquidity (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) in connection with the limits set by the RAS. Failure to attain any of these indicators will result in a reduction of the remuneration.

Moreover, no short-term variable remuneration or long-term remuneration is accrued if overall attainment of objectives (mix of Group and individual objectives) is less than 60%.

In addition, there are prudential mechanisms for adjusting the individual attainment, based on exceedance of expected loss thresholds in terms of operational risk and/or internal control indicators.

Ex-ante risk adjustments

The total amount of any variable remuneration item is subject to downward adjustment at the discretion of the Board of Directors based on a recommendation by the Remuneration Committee, and may even be reduced to zero on the basis of the parameters described in section 3.1.2.B), which include:

- Risk and control factors such as breaches of standards and regulations, breach of risk limits e.g., RAS (capital adequacy, liquidity) or breach of expected loss thresholds in terms of operational risk, and/or internal control indicators (e.g. results of internal audits) and similar items.
- Maximum Distributable Amount (MDA) that is below the threshold required by regulation.

Taking the above into account, the final amount of the short-term variable remuneration accrued annually (subject to ex-post adjustments) will be determined by the Board of Directors, following a recommendation by the Remuneration Committee, based on the individual assigned short-term and/or long-term variable remuneration, evaluation of the degree of attainment of individual performance objectives assigned to the executive directors, and application of the variable remuneration adjustment.

Deferral and payment

Short-term variable remuneration is deferred as follows:

- Deferral over at least five years for executive directors and other members of Senior Management and at least four years for the rest of the Identified Staff.
- Deferral of at least 60% in the case of executive directors and of the members of the Identified Staff whose variable remuneration exceeds €1,500,000, and 40% for the other members of the Identified Staff.
- The deferred remuneration is paid 55% in the form of Banco Sabadell shares in the case of executive directors and other members of Senior Management, and at least 50% in the case of the rest of the Identified Staff.
- Variable remuneration paid in shares is subject to one-year lock-up. In line with recommendation 62 of the Code of Good Governance, unless executive directors own shares amounting to the equivalent of twice their fixed annual remuneration, they may not dispose of the shares they receive until at least three years have elapsed from the time of delivery. The above condition will not apply to any shares that the Director must dispose of to cover tax obligations related to their delivery.
- The use of personal hedging strategies or any mechanism that guarantees receipt of part or all of the variable remuneration is not permitted.

The specific payment schedule for the 2024 and 2025 short-term variable remuneration can be found in sections 2.1.1.B) and 3.1.2.B), respectively.

Deferred variable annual remuneration is also paid 55% in the form of Banco Sabadell shares in the case of executive directors, other members of Senior Management and the rest of the Identified Staff. The

time horizon for measurement of the annual objectives that determine the adjusted reference amount up to the last payment date is 5 years, excluding the lock-up period applicable to any shares delivered. The payment schedules for long-term remuneration in force in 2024 and 2025 are shown in Sections 2.1.1.C), 3.1.2.C) and D).

Malus and clawback clauses

Short-term variable remuneration and long-term remuneration that has not yet been collected (up to 100% of the amount) may be reduced or cancelled (malus clauses) and amounts collected may have to be refunded (clawback clauses) in the event of poor financial performance by the Bank as a whole or by a specific division or area or by the exposures generated by the executive director to whom they are applicable. It is not necessary for there to be malice or negligence in order for these clauses to apply. For these purposes, the performance assessment will be compared with subsequent performance of the variables that contributed to achieving the objectives. The factors described in section 3.1.2.B) will be taken into account.

Oversight by governing bodies and divisions of the Institution

Without prejudice to the functions described above and those corresponding to the Institution's Remuneration Committee and Board of Directors, the functions of other governing and management bodies of the Institution entrusted with oversight over remuneration are listed below:

- The Risk Committee checks to ensure that employee remuneration programmes are coherent with the Bank's risk, capital and liquidity, and provides advice in this respect to the Remuneration Committee.
- The Audit and Control Committee supervises the process of drafting and presenting the regulated financial information, including that relating to remuneration, and reviews compliance with the regulatory requirements and proper application of accounting standards.
- The Internal Audit Division, within the framework of its functions, carries out an independent examination, at least once per year, of the definition and application of the Institution's Remuneration Policy and its effects on its risk profile, and the way in which these effects are managed. Additionally, the Prudential Review of Remuneration produced by specialized firm Mercer Consulting, S.L. for the Risk Committee and Remuneration Committee assesses and guarantees that the delimitation of the Institution's Identified Staff and the remuneration practices and policies conform to the requirements established in the regulations and guidelines of the EBA and the Bank of Spain.
- Each year, the CRO submits to the Remuneration Committee a proposal for the adjustment of the variable remuneration, which may be at Group, unit, country or even individual level, to be made at the end of the year, depending on the risk profile and earnings performance.

This Annual Report on Director Remuneration was approved by Banco Sabadell's Board of Directors at a meeting on:

29/01/2025

No Directors abstained or voted against the adoption of this Report.

The English version is a Translation of the original in Spanish and is provided for information purposes only. In case of discrepancy, the original version in Spanish shall prevail.



6. Reconciliation with the CNMV Annual Report on Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies

Below is a table of equivalences detailing the location, in this Report, of the content established in the official CNMV format of the Report on Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies, approved by Circular 3/2021.

**Banco Sabadell Annual
Report on Director
Remuneration**

Content of the form per Circular 3/2021

A. Company's Remuneration Policy for the current financial year

A.1.1

Describe the current Director Remuneration Policy applicable to the current year. To the extent relevant, include disclosures relating to the Remuneration Policy approved by the General Meeting of Shareholders, provided that these references are clear, specific and concrete.

Sections 1, 2 & 4

Describe the specific decisions by the Board that apply to this year, relating to both Directors' remuneration for their functions as such and for executive functions, as provided in the contracts signed with the executive directors, and to the general Remuneration Policy approved by the General Meeting of Shareholders.

In any event, the following should be disclosed:

- a)** Description of the company's procedures and the bodies involved in determining, approving and applying the Remuneration Policy and its terms and conditions.
- b)** Indicate whether the company's Remuneration Policy was benchmarked against other companies and, if so, give details.
- c)** Disclose whether any external advisors were involved in this process and, if so, identify them.
- d)** Procedures contemplated in the current Director Remuneration Policy for applying temporary exceptions to the policy, conditions under which such exceptions may be used, and components that may be subject to exception under the policy.

A.1.2

Proportion between variable remuneration and fixed remuneration (remuneration mix) and the criteria and objectives used to determine and ensure an appropriate balance between the fixed and variable components of remuneration. In particular, state the actions adopted by the company in relation to the remuneration system to reduce exposure to excessive risks and adjust it to the company's long-term objectives, values and interests, including references to any measures to guarantee that the company's long-term results are taken into account in the Remuneration Policy, the measures adopted in relation to those categories of staff whose work has a material impact on the company's risk profile and any measures to avoid conflicts of interest. Also disclose if the company has established a period for the accrual or vesting of certain variable remuneration items, whether in cash, shares or other financial instruments, any period of deferral of the payment of amounts or the delivery of accrued or vested financial instruments, any clause that reduces the unvested deferred remuneration or that obliges the Director to refund remuneration already received, where such remuneration was based on figures that have been clearly shown to be inaccurate.

Sections 2.1 & 5

| | |
|--|-------------------------------|
| — Amount and nature of fixed components that are to be accrued by Directors during the year for membership of the Board of Directors per se. | Section 3.2 |
| — Amount and nature of fixed components that are to be accrued during the year for the performance of Senior Management functions by executive directors. | Section 3.1 |
| — Amount and nature of any component of remuneration in kind that will accrue during the year, including, but not limited to, insurance premiums paid in favour of the Director. | Section 3.1 |
| — Amount and nature of variable components, differentiating between short and long term. Financial and non-financial parameters, including social, environmental and climate change, parameters selected to determine variable remuneration in the current year, describing the extent to which these parameters are related to performance, both of the Director and of the company, together with their risk profile, and the methodology, necessary period and the techniques established to determine the degree of compliance with the parameters used in the design of the variable remuneration at the end of the year, describing in detail the criteria and factors applied in terms of the time required and methods for verifying that the performance conditions or any other type of conditions to which the accrual and vesting of each component of variable remuneration was linked were actually fulfilled. State the range, in monetary terms, of the variable components according to the degree of attainment of the objectives and established parameters, and whether there is an absolute monetary cap. | Sections 3.1 & 5 |
| — Main characteristics of long-term savings systems. Among other information, state the contingencies covered by the system, whether it is defined-contribution or defined-benefit, the annual contribution to be made to the defined-contribution system, the benefits Directors are entitled to under defined-benefit systems, the conditions under which economic rights vest for Directors and their compatibility with any other type of payment or severance pay as a result of the early termination or dismissal of the Director, or deriving from the termination of the contractual relation, in the terms provided, between the company and the Director. State if the accrual or vesting of any of the long-term savings plans is linked to achieving certain objectives or parameters related to the Director's short- or long-term performance. | Section 3.1 |
| — Any type of payment or termination indemnity for early termination or dismissal of the Director, or deriving from the termination of the contractual relationship between the company and the Director, in the terms provided, whether by voluntary resignation by the Director or dismissal of the Director by the company, as well as any type of agreement, such as exclusivity, post-contractual non-competition, permanence or loyalty, which entitle the Director to any type of remuneration. | Section 3.1 |
| — Describe the conditions with which contracts with executive directors for performing Senior Management functions must comply. Among other aspects, give information on the term, limits to the amounts of indemnity, permanence clauses, notice periods and payments in lieu of notice, and any other clauses regarding hiring bonuses, as well as severance payments or golden handshakes for early cancellation or termination of the contractual relationship between the company and the executive director. Include, among others, any non-compete, exclusivity, permanence and loyalty, and post-contractual non-competition pacts or agreements, except where they have already been disclosed in the previous section. | Section 3.1 |
| — The nature and estimated amount of any other supplementary remuneration accrued by Directors in the year as consideration for services rendered other than those inherent to their position as Directors. | Sections 3.1 & 3.2 |
| — Other remuneration items, such as those arising from the company granting the Director advance payments, loans, guarantees or any other remuneration. | Sections 2.1 & 3.1 |
| — The nature and estimated amount of any other planned supplementary remuneration that is not disclosed in the preceding sections, whether paid by the institution or by another institution in the Group, which will be accrued by Directors during the current year. | Sections 2.1 & 3.1 |

A.2.

Describe any material change in the Remuneration Policy applicable in the current year resulting from:

Sections 1 & 3

- A new policy or an amendment of the policy already approved by the General Meeting of Shareholders.
- Material changes in the specific determinations established by the Board for the current year regarding the Remuneration Policy in force, in comparison with those applied in the previous year.
- Proposals that the Board of Directors has resolved to submit to the General Meeting of Shareholders to which this annual report will be submitted and which are proposed to be applicable to the current year.

A.3.

Identify the direct link to the document where the current company Remuneration Policy is posted, which must be available on the company's website.

Introduction

A.4.

Considering the data provided in Section B.4, describe the outcome of the consultative vote at the General Meeting of Shareholders on the previous year's Annual Report on Remuneration.

Section 2

B. Overall summary of how the Remuneration Policy was applied during the reporting year.

B.1.

Describe the process used to apply the Remuneration Policy and to determine the individual remuneration set out in Section C of this report. This information must include the role played by the Remuneration Committee, the decisions taken by the Board of Directors and the identity and the role of any external advisers engaged for the process of applying the Remuneration Policy in the reporting year.

Section 2

B.1.2.

Describe any departure during the year from the procedure established for applying the Remuneration Policy.

Section 2

B.1.3.

Indicate whether any temporary exceptions were made to the Remuneration Policy and, if so, describe the exceptional circumstances that led to the application of these exceptions, the specific components of the Remuneration Policy that were affected and the reasons why the entity considers that those exceptions were necessary to serve the long-term interests and sustainability of the company as a whole or to ensure its viability. Also quantify the impact that the application of these exceptions had on the remuneration of each Director during the year.

Section 2

B.2.

Detail the actions taken by the company in relation to the remuneration system and how they contributed to reducing exposure to excessive risks and adapting it to the company's long-term objectives, values and interests, including a reference to any measures that have been adopted to ensure that the company's long-term results were taken into consideration in setting the remuneration actually accrued and that a suitable balance was attained between the fixed and variable components of remuneration, any measures adopted in relation to those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material repercussion on the company's risk profile and any measures that have been adopted to avoid conflicts of interest.

Sections 2.1 & 5

- The nature and estimated amount of any other planned supplementary remuneration that is not disclosed in the preceding sections, whether paid by the institution or by another institution in the Group, which will be accrued by Directors during the current year.

Sections 2.1 & 3.1

B.3.

Detail how the remuneration that accrued and vested in the year meets the provisions of the current Remuneration Policy and, in particular, how it contributes to the company's long-term sustainable performance. Also, disclose the relationship between the remuneration obtained by the Directors and the company's results or other performance metrics, detailing how any variations in the company's performance influenced changes in Director remuneration, including remuneration accrued but deferred, and how they contribute to the company's short- and long-term results.

Sections 2.1 & 5

B.4.

Describe the outcome of the consultative vote at the General Meeting of Shareholders on the Annual Report on Remuneration for the previous year, indicating the number of abstentions and votes cast against, blank votes and votes in favour: % of total Votes cast Number as% of votes cast Votes against Votes in favour Blank votes Abstentions Comments

Section 2**B.5.**

Describe how the fixed components of remuneration that were accrued and vested during the year by the Directors in their capacity as such were determined, the proportion allocated to each Director and how they changed with respect to the previous year:

Section 2.2**B.6.**

Describe how the salaries accrued and vested by each of the executive directors in the last year for performing executive functions were determined, and how they changed with respect to the previous year.

Section 2.1

Describe and give the main features of the variable components of the remuneration systems accrued and vested in the reporting year. In particular:

a) Identify each of the remuneration plans that determined the various types of variable remuneration accrued by each of the Directors in the reporting year, including information on their scope, approval date, implementation date, any vesting conditions, the periods of accrual and validity, the criteria used to assess performance and how this affected the establishment of the variable amount that accrued, as well as the measurement criteria that were applied and the period that must elapse in order to be in a position to suitably measure all the applicable conditions and criteria, and describe in detail the criteria and factors applied in terms of the time required and methods for verifying that the performance conditions or any other type of conditions to which the accrual and vesting of each component of variable remuneration was linked were actually fulfilled.

b) In the case of stock options and other financial instruments, the general characteristics of each plan must contain information on the conditions required both to achieve unconditional ownership (vesting) and to exercise such options or financial instruments, including the strike price and exercise period.

c) Name and category (Executive Director, Proprietary External Director, Independent External Director and Other External Director) of each of the Directors who are beneficiaries of remuneration systems or plans that include variable remuneration.

d) Disclose any accrual, vesting or deferral periods that were applied to the payment of vested amounts and/or any periods of lock-up/non-disposal for shares or other financial instruments.

Describe the short-term variable components of the remuneration systems.
Describe the components.

B.7.

Describe and give the main features of the variable components of the remuneration systems accrued and vested in the reporting year. In particular:

- Identify each of the remuneration plans that determined the various types of variable remuneration accrued by each of the Directors in the reporting year, including information on their scope, approval date, implementation date, any vesting conditions, the periods of accrual and validity, the criteria used to assess performance and how this affected the establishment of the variable amount that accrued, as well as the measurement criteria that were applied and the period that must elapse in order to be in a position to suitably measure all the applicable conditions and criteria, and describe in detail the criteria and factors applied in terms of the time required and methods for verifying that the performance conditions or any other type of conditions to which the accrual and vesting of each component of variable remuneration was linked were actually fulfilled.
- In the case of stock options and other financial instruments, the general characteristics of each plan must contain information on the conditions required both to achieve unconditional ownership (vesting) and to exercise such options or financial instruments, including the strike price and exercise period.
- Name and category (Executive Director, Proprietary External Director, Independent External Director and Other External Director) of each of the directors who are beneficiaries of remuneration systems or plans that include variable remuneration.
- Disclose any accrual, vesting or deferral periods that were applied to the payment of vested amounts and/or any periods of lock-up/non-disposal for shares or other financial instruments.

Sections 2.1 & 5

B.8.

Indicate whether any accrued variable components were reduced or clawed back after deferral of unvested amounts (in the former case) or vesting and payment (in the latter case) on the basis of data which were subsequently shown to be manifestly inaccurate. Describe the amounts reduced or clawed back through the application of the malus or clawback clauses, why they were implemented and the years to which they refer.

Section 2.1

B.9.

Describe the main characteristics of the long-term savings systems where the amount or equivalent annual cost appears in the tables in Section C, including retirement and any other survivorship benefits that are financed, totally or partially, by the company, whether through internal or external contributions, indicating the type of plan, whether it is defined-contribution or defined-benefit, the contingencies covered, the conditions for the economic rights to vest for Directors, and their compatibility with any type of severance pay for early termination or termination of the contractual relationship between the company and the Director.

Section 2.1

B.10.

Describe any termination indemnities or other payments arising from early dismissal or early resignation, or from the termination of the contract, in its own terms, that were accrued and/or received by Directors during the reporting year.

Section 2.1

B.11.

Indicate whether there were any significant changes in the contracts of persons performing Senior Management functions, such as executive directors, and, if so, describe them. Additionally, describe the main conditions of new contracts signed with executive directors during the year, unless already described in Section A.1.

Sections 2.1 & 3.1

B.12.

Describe any additional remuneration paid to Directors for services rendered other than those inherent to their Directorship.

Sections 2.1 & 2.2

B.13.

Describe any remuneration deriving from advance payments, loans or guarantees granted, indicating the interest rate, the main features and any amounts that were repaid, as well as any collateral obligations assumed on their behalf.

Sections 2.1 & 2.2

B.14.

Detail any remuneration in kind accrued by the Directors in the year, briefly indicating the nature of the various salary components.

Section 2.1

B.15.

Describe any remuneration accrued by Directors in the form of payments settled by the listed company with third parties where the Director renders services, where such payments are intended to compensate the Director's services to the company.

Sections 2.1 & 2.2**B.16.**

Describe and detail any items of remuneration accrued under any other remuneration heading not already disclosed above, regardless of their nature or the group company that made the payment, including any remuneration, in any form, that qualifies as a related-party transaction or, in particular, where it has a material impact on the true and fair view of the total remuneration accrued by the Director; it is necessary to describe the amount paid or pending payment, the nature of the consideration received, and any reasons why it was decided that it did not qualify as remuneration for the Director's position as such or as consideration for executive functions, and whether or not it was considered appropriate to report it under amounts accrued under the heading of "Other items" in section C.

Sections 2.1 & 2.2

C. Itemized individual remuneration of each Director

Statistical annex

Section 7

7. Statistical annex

ISSUER IDENTIFICATION DATA

Date of end of reference year:

31/12/2024

Tax ID number:

A-08000143

Company name:

BANCO DE SABADELL, S.A.

Business address:

AV. OSCAR ESPLA N.37 (ALICANTE)

B. OVERALL SUMMARY OF HOW THE REMUNERATION POLICY WAS APPLIED DURING THE REPORTING YEAR

B.4. Describe the outcome of the consultative vote at the general meeting on the Annual Remuneration Report for the previous year, indicating the number of votes cast for, against, and blank votes if any:

| | Number | % of total |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------------|
| Votes cast | 3,360,348 | 61.79 |
| | Number | % of votes cast |
| Votes against | 93,206 | 2.77 |
| Votes in favour | 3,256,556 | 96.91 |
| Blank votes | | 0.00 |
| Abstentions | 10,586 | 0.32 |

C. ITEMISED INDIVIDUAL REMUNERATION OF EACH DIRECTOR

| Name | Category | Accrual period in 2024 |
|---|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | Chairman Other External | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Mr. PEDRO FONTANA GARCÍA | Deputy Chairman Independent | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | CEO | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Ms. AURORA CATÁ SALA | Independent director | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Ms. ANA COLONQUES GARCÍA-PLANAS | Independent director | From 27/05/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Mr. LLUÍS DEULOFEU FUGUET | Independent director | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | Other external director | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Ms. MIREYA GINÉ TORRENS | Independent director | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Ms. LAURA GONZÁLEZ MOLERO | Independent director | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Mr. GEORGE DONALD JOHNSTON III | Lead Independent Director | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Mr. DAVID MARTÍNEZ GUZMÁN | Proprietary director | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Mr. JOSÉ MANUEL MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ | Independent director | From 01/01/2024 to 10/04/2024 |
| Ms. ALICIA REYES REVUELTA | Independent director | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Mr. MANUEL VALLS MORATÓ | Independent director | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | Executive director | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |
| Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA | Independent director | From 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2024 |

C.1. Complete the following tables on the individual remuneration accrued during the year by each of the directors (including remuneration for carrying out executive functions).

a) Remuneration from the reporting company:

i) Remuneration in cash (thousand euro)

| Name | Fixed remuneration | Per diems | Remuneration for membership of Board of Directors committees | Wages | Short-term variable remuneration | Long-term variable remuneration | Indemnities | Other items | 2024 total | 2023 total |
|---|--------------------|-----------|--|-------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | 1,600 | 25 | | | 19 | 58 | | | 1,702 | 1,639 |
| Mr. PEDRO FONTANA GARCÍA | 207 | 25 | 158 | | | | | | 390 | 342 |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | 100 | 25 | | 1,664 | 339 | 151 | | 4 | 2,283 | 1,499 |
| Ms. AURORA CATÁ SALA | 100 | 25 | 65 | | | | | | 190 | 173 |
| Ms. ANA COLONQUES GARCÍA-PLANAS | 66 | 16 | 41 | | | | | | 123 | |
| Mr. LLUÍS DEULOFEU FUGUET | 100 | 25 | 75 | | | | | | 200 | 175 |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | 100 | 25 | 70 | | | 10 | 44 | | 249 | 234 |
| Ms. MIREYA GINÉ TORRENS | 100 | 25 | 77 | | | | | | 202 | 165 |
| Ms. LAURA GONZÁLEZ MOLERO | 100 | 25 | 70 | | | | | | 195 | 145 |
| Mr. GEORGE DONALD JOHNSTON III | 122 | 25 | 97 | | | | | | 244 | 206 |
| Mr. DAVID MARTÍNEZ GUZMÁN | 100 | 25 | | | | | | | 125 | 95 |
| Mr. JOSÉ MANUEL MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ | 25 | 7 | 20 | | | | | | 52 | 170 |
| Ms. ALICIA REYES REVUELTA | 100 | 25 | 75 | | | | | | 200 | 170 |
| Mr. MANUEL VALLS MORATÓ | 100 | 25 | 110 | | | | | | 235 | 178 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | 100 | 25 | | 581 | 44 | 41 | | 2 | 793 | 749 |
| Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA | 100 | 25 | 80 | | | | | | 205 | 90 |

ii) Table of changes in share-based remuneration schemes and gross profit from vested shares or financial instruments.

| Name | Plan | Financial instruments at the beginning of 2024 | | Financial instruments granted during 2024 | | Financial instruments that vested in the year | | | | Instruments vested but not exercised | Financial instruments at the end of 2024 | |
|---|---------------|--|--------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|----------------------------------|------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|
| | | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent shares | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent shares | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent/ vested shares | Price of vested shares | Gross profit on vested shares or financial instruments (thousand euro) | No. of instruments | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent shares |
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | RLP 2019-2021 | 23,280 | 23,280 | | | 23,280 | 23,280 | 1.72 | 40 | | | |
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | RLP 2021-2023 | 130,732 | 130,732 | | | 78,439 | 78,439 | 1.72 | 135 | | 52,293 | 52,293 |
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | RV 2021 | 90,834 | 90,834 | | | 30,278 | 30,278 | 1.72 | 52 | | 60,556 | 60,556 |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | RLP 2021-2023 | 522,619 | 522,619 | | | 313,572 | 313,572 | 1.72 | 541 | | 209,048 | 209,048 |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | RLP 2022-2024 | 437,928 | 437,928 | | | | | 0.00 | | | 437,928 | 437,928 |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | RLP 2023-2025 | 454,130 | 454,130 | | | | | 0.00 | | | 454,130 | 454,130 |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | RLP 2024-2026 | | | 349,484 | 349,484 | | | 0.00 | | | 349,484 | 349,484 |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | RV 2021 | 142,539 | 142,539 | | | 47,513 | 47,513 | 1.72 | 82 | | 95,026 | 95,026 |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ- | RV 2022 | 149,220 | 149,220 | | | 37,305 | 37,305 | 1.72 | 64 | | 111,915 | 111,915 |

ANNUAL REPORT ON THE REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS OF LISTED PUBLIC COMPANIES

| Name | Plan | Financial instruments at the beginning of 2024 | | Financial instruments granted during 2024 | | Financial instruments that vested in the year | | | | Instruments vested but not exercised | Financial instruments at the end of 2024 | |
|---|---------------|--|--------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|----------------------------------|------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|
| | | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent shares | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent shares | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent/ vested shares | Price of vested shares | Gross profit on vested shares or financial instruments (thousand euro) | No. of instruments | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent shares |
| BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ - BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | RV 2023 | 271,110 | 271,110 | | | 54,222 | 54,222 | 1.72 | 94 | | 216,888 | 216,888 |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ - BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | RV 2024 | | | 336,774 | 336,774 | 127,084 | 127,084 | 1,72 | 219 | | 209,690 | 209,690 |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | RLP 2019-2021 | 6,088 | 6,088 | | | 6,088 | 6,088 | 1.72 | 11 | | | |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | RLP 2020-2022 | 33,594 | 33,594 | | | 16,797 | 50,391 | 1.72 | 29 | | 16,797 | 16,797 |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | Indemnities | 306,696 | 306,696 | | | 102,232 | 102,232 | 1.72 | 176 | | 204,464 | 204,464 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | RLP 2019-2021 | 5,384 | 5,384 | | | 5,384 | 5,384 | 1.72 | 9 | | | |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | RLP 2020-2022 | 42,194 | 42,194 | | | 21,097 | 21,097 | 1.72 | 36 | | 21,097 | 21,097 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | RLP 2021-2023 | 105,070 | 105,070 | | | 63,042 | 63,042 | 1.72 | 109 | | 42,028 | 42,028 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | RLP 2022-2024 | 83,625 | 83,625 | | | | | 0.00 | | | 83,625 | 83,625 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | RLP 2023-2025 | 73,896 | 73,896 | | | | | 0.00 | | | 73,896 | 73,896 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | RLP 2024-2026 | | | 58,567 | 58,567 | | | 0.00 | | | 58,567 | 58,567 |

ANNUAL REPORT ON THE REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS OF LISTED PUBLIC COMPANIES

| Name | Plan | Financial instruments at the beginning of 2024 | | Financial instruments granted during 2024 | | Financial instruments that vested in the year | | | | Instruments vested but not exercised | Financial instruments at the end of 2024 | |
|---------------------------|---------|--|--------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|----------------------------------|------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|
| | | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent shares | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent shares | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent/ vested shares | Price of vested shares | Gross profit on vested shares or financial instruments (thousand euro) | No. of instruments | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent shares |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | RV 2021 | 25,470 | 25,470 | | | 8,490 | 8,490 | 1.72 | 15 | | 16,980 | 16,980 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | RV 2022 | 21,708 | 21,708 | | | 5,427 | 5,427 | 1.72 | 9 | | 16,281 | 16,281 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | RV 2023 | 31,900 | 31,900 | | | 6,380 | 6,380 | 1.72 | 11 | | 25,520 | 25,520 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | RV 2024 | | | 40,811 | 40,811 | 15,401 | 15,401 | 1.72 | 27 | | 25,410 | 25,410 |

iii) Long-term savings systems.

| Name | Remuneration from vesting of rights within savings systems |
|---|--|
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | |
| Mr. PEDRO FONTANA GARCÍA | |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | 1 |
| Ms. AURORA CATÁ SALA | |
| Ms. ANA COLONQUES GARCÍA-PLANAS | |
| Mr. LLUÍS DEULOFEU FUGUET | |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | |
| Ms. MIREYA GINÉ TORRENS | |
| Ms. LAURA GONZÁLEZ MOLERO | |
| Mr. GEORGE DONALD JOHNSTON III | |

ANNUAL REPORT ON THE REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS OF LISTED PUBLIC COMPANIES

| Name | Remuneration from vesting of rights within savings systems |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| Mr. DAVID MARTÍNEZ GUZMÁN | |
| Mr. JOSÉ MANUEL MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ | |
| Ms. ALICIA REYES REVUELTA | |
| Mr. MANUEL VALLS MORATÓ | |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | 1 |
| Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA | |

| Name | Company's contribution for the year (thousand euro) | | | | Amount of accumulated funds (thousand euro) | | | |
|--|---|------|--|------|---|-------|--|-------|
| | Saving plans with vested economic rights | | Saving plans with unvested economic rights | | Saving plans with vested economic rights | | Saving plans with unvested economic rights | |
| | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 |
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | | | | | | | 1,587 | 1,489 |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ- BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | 1 | 1 | 300 | 855 | 4 | 3 | 1,213 | 876 |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | | | | | 4,943 | 4,660 | 2,638 | 1,500 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | 1 | 1 | 110 | 104 | 5 | 3 | 607 | 467 |

iv) Details of other items

| Name | Description | Remuneration amount |
|---|----------------------|---------------------|
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | | |
| Mr. PEDRO FONTANA GARCÍA | | |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | Remuneration in kind | 25 |
| Ms. AURORA CATÁ SALA | | |
| Ms. ANA COLONQUES GARCÍA-PLANAS | | |
| Mr. LLUÍS DEULOFEU FUGUET | | |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | | |
| Ms. MIREYA GINÉ TORRENS | | |
| Ms. LAURA GONZÁLEZ MOLERO | | |
| Mr. GEORGE DONALD JOHNSTON III | | |
| Mr. DAVID MARTÍNEZ GUZMÁN | | |
| Mr. JOSÉ MANUEL MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ | | |
| Ms. ALICIA REYES REVUELTA | | |
| Mr. MANUEL VALLS MORATÓ | | |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | Remuneration in kind | 40 |
| Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA | | |

b) Remuneration of directors of the listed company for membership of governing bodies of its subsidiaries:

i) Remuneration in cash (thousand euro)

| Name | Fixed remuneration | Per diems | Remuneration for membership of Board of Directors committees | Wages | Short-term variable remuneration | Long-term variable remuneration | Indemnities | Other items | 2024 total | 2023 total |
|---|--------------------|-----------|--|-------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mr. PEDRO FONTANA GARCÍA | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ms. AURORA CATÁ SALA | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ms. ANA COLONQUES GARCÍA-PLANAS | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mr. LLUÍS DEULOFEU FUGUET | 30 | | | | | | | | 30 | 30 |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ms. MIREYA GINÉ TORRENS | 28 | | | | | | | | 28 | 30 |
| Ms. LAURA GONZÁLEZ MOLERO | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mr. GEORGE DONALD JOHNSTON III | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mr. DAVID MARTÍNEZ GUZMÁN | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mr. JOSÉ MANUEL MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ms. ALICIA REYES REVUELTA | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mr. MANUEL VALLS MORATÓ | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA | | | | | | | | | | |

ii) Table of changes in share-based remuneration schemes and gross profit from vested shares or financial instruments.

| Name | Plan | Financial instruments at the beginning of 2024 | | Financial instruments granted during 2024 | | Financial instruments that vested in the year | | | | Instruments vested but not exercised | Financial instruments at the end of 2024 | |
|---|------|--|--------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|----------------------------------|------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|
| | | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent shares | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent shares | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent/ vested shares | Price of vested shares | Gross profit on vested shares or financial instruments (thousand euro) | No. of instruments | No. of instruments | No. of equivalent shares |
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | - | | | | | | | 0.00 | | | | |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ - BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | - | | | | | | | 0.00 | | | | |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | - | | | | | | | 0.00 | | | | |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | - | | | | | | | 0.00 | | | | |

iii) Long-term savings systems.

| Name | Remuneration from vesting of rights within savings systems |
|----------------------|--|
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | |

| Name | Remuneration from vesting of rights within savings systems |
|---|---|
| Mr. PEDRO FONTANA GARCÍA | |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | |
| Ms. AURORA CATÁ SALA | |
| Ms. ANA COLONQUES GARCÍA-PLANAS | |
| Mr. LLUÍS DEULOFEU FUGUET | |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | |
| Ms. MIREYA GINÉ TORRENS | |
| Ms. LAURA GONZÁLEZ MOLERO | |
| Mr. GEORGE DONALD JOHNSTON III | |
| Mr. DAVID MARTÍNEZ GUZMÁN | |
| Mr. JOSÉ MANUEL MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ | |
| Ms. ALICIA REYES REVUELTA | |
| Mr. MANUEL VALLS MORATÓ | |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | |
| Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA | |

| Name | Company's contribution for the year (thousand euro) | | | | Amount of accumulated funds (thousand euro) | | | |
|----------------------|---|------|--|------|---|------|--|------|
| | Saving plans with vested economic rights | | Saving plans with unvested economic rights | | Saving plans with vested economic rights | | Saving plans with unvested economic rights | |
| | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 |
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | | | | | | | | |

| Name | Company's contribution for the year (thousand euro) | | | | Amount of accumulated funds (thousand euro) | | | |
|---|---|------|--|------|---|------|--|------|
| | Saving plans with vested economic rights | | Saving plans with unvested economic rights | | Saving plans with vested economic rights | | Saving plans with unvested economic rights | |
| | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2023 |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | | | | | | | | |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | | | | | | | | |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | | | | | | | | |

iv) Details of other items

| Name | Description | Remuneration amount |
|---|-------------|---------------------|
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | | |
| Mr. PEDRO FONTANA GARCÍA | | |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | | |
| Ms. AURORA CATÁ SALA | | |
| Ms. ANA COLONQUES GARCÍA-PLANAS | | |
| Mr. LLUÍS DEULOFEU FUGUET | | |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | | |
| Ms. MIREYA GINÉ TORRENS | | |
| Ms. LAURA GONZÁLEZ MOLERO | | |

ANNUAL REPORT ON THE REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS OF LISTED PUBLIC COMPANIES

| Name | Description | Remuneration amount |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|---------------------|
| Mr. GEORGE DONALD JOHNSTON III | | |
| Mr. DAVID MARTÍNEZ GUZMÁN | | |
| Mr. JOSÉ MANUEL MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ | | |
| Ms. ALICIA REYES REVUELTA | | |
| Mr. MANUEL VALLS MORATÓ | | |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | | |
| Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA | | |

c) Summary of remuneration (thousand euro):

Summarise the amounts corresponding to all the remuneration items included in this report that have accrued to the director, in thousand euro.

| Name | Remuneration accrued in the company | | | | | Remuneration accrued in group companies | | | | | 2024 total company + group |
|--|-------------------------------------|---|--|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|---|---|--|--------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Total cash remuneration | Gross profit on vested shares or financial instruments (thousand euro) | Remuneration under savings systems | Remuneration under other items | 2024 total company | Total cash remuneration | Gross profit on vested shares or financial instruments (thousand euro) | Remuneration under savings systems | Remuneration under other items | 2024 total group | |
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | 1,702 | 227 | | | 1,929 | | | | | | 1,929 |
| Mr. PEDRO FONTANA GARCÍA | 390 | | | | 390 | | | | | | 390 |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ- BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | 2,283 | 1,000 | 1 | 25 | 3,309 | | | | | | 3,309 |

ANNUAL REPORT ON THE REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS OF LISTED PUBLIC COMPANIES

| Name | Remuneration accrued in the companyi | | | | | Remuneration accrued in group companies | | | | | 2024 total company + group |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|--|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|---|---|--|--------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Total cash remuneration | Gross profit on vested shares or financial instruments (thousand euro) | Remuneration under savings systems | Remuneration under other items | 2024 total company | Total cash remuneration | Gross profit on vested shares or financial instruments (thousand euro) | Remuneration under savings systems | Remuneration under other items | 2024 total group | |
| Ms. AURORA CATÁ SALA | 190 | | | | 190 | | | | | | 190 |
| Ms. ANA COLONQUES GARCÍA-PLANAS | 123 | | | | 123 | | | | | | 123 |
| Mr. LLUÍS DEULOFEU FUGUET | 200 | | | | 200 | 30 | | | | 30 | 230 |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | 249 | 216 | | | 465 | | | | | | 465 |
| Ms. MIREYA GINÉ TORRENS | 202 | | | | 202 | 28 | | | | 28 | 230 |
| Ms. LAURA GONZÁLEZ MOLERO | 195 | | | | 195 | | | | | | 195 |
| Mr. GEORGE DONALD JOHNSTON III | 244 | | | | 244 | | | | | | 244 |
| Mr. DAVID MARTÍNEZ GUZMÁN | 125 | | | | 125 | | | | | | 125 |
| Mr. JOSÉ MANUEL MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ | 52 | | | | 52 | | | | | | 52 |
| Ms. ALICIA REYES REVUELTA | 200 | | | | 200 | | | | | | 200 |

ANNUAL REPORT ON THE REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS OF LISTED PUBLIC COMPANIES

| Name | Remuneration accrued in the company | | | | | Remuneration accrued in group companies | | | | | 2024 total company + group |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|---|--|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|----------------------------|
| | Total cash remuneration | Gross profit on vested shares or financial instruments (thousand euro) | Remuneration under savings systems | Remuneration under other items | 2024 total company | Total cash remuneration | Gross profit on vested shares or financial instruments (thousand euro) | Remuneration under savings systems | Remuneration under other items | 2024 total group | |
| Mr. MANUEL VALLS MORATÓ | 235 | | | | 235 | | | | | | 235 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | 793 | 216 | 1 | 40 | 1,050 | | | | | | 1,050 |
| Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA | 205 | | | | 205 | | | | | | 205 |
| Total | 7,388 | 1,659 | 2 | 65 | 9,114 | 58 | | | | 58 | 9,172 |

C.2. Indicate the changes over the last five years in the amount and percentage change in the remuneration accrued by each of the listed company's directors during the year, in the consolidated results of the company and in the average remuneration on a full-time equivalent basis of the employees of the company and its subsidiaries who are not directors of the listed company.

| | Total amounts accrued and % change per annum | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--------------------|-------|--------------------|-------|--------------------|-------|--------------------|------|
| | 2024 | % Change 2024/2023 | 2023 | % Change 2023/2022 | 2022 | % Change 2022/2021 | 2021 | % Change 2021/2020 | 2020 |
| Executive directors | | | | | | | | | |
| Mr. CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ-BUENO MAYER WITTGENSTEIN | 3,309 | 84.14 | 1,797 | -27.42 | 2,476 | 30.04 | 1,904 | - | 0 |
| Mr. DAVID VEGARA FIGUERAS | 1,050 | 20.55 | 871 | 15.36 | 755 | 12.02 | 674 | 21.44 | 555 |
| External directors | | | | | | | | | |

ANNUAL REPORT ON THE REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS OF LISTED PUBLIC COMPANIES

| | Total amounts accrued and % change per annum | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|-----------------------|-----------|-----------------------|-----------|-----------------------|---------|-----------------------|----------|
| | 2024 | % Change 2024/2023 | 2023 | % Change 2023/2022 | 2022 | % Change 2022/2021 | 2021 | % Change 2021/2020 | 2020 |
| Mr. JOSEP OLIU CREUS | 1,929 | 13.27 | 1,703 | -3.62 | 1,767 | -5.46 | 1,869 | -5.89 | 1,986 |
| Mr. PEDRO FONTANA GARCÍA | 390 | 14.04 | 342 | 2.09 | 335 | 30.35 | 257 | 29.80 | 198 |
| Ms. AURORA CATÁ SALA | 190 | 9.83 | 173 | -10.82 | 194 | -4.43 | 203 | 9.14 | 186 |
| Ms. ANA COLONQUES GARCÍA- PLANAS | 123 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 |
| Mr. LLUÍS DEULOFEU FUGUET | 230 | 12.20 | 205 | 0.00 | 205 | 365.91 | 44 | - | 0 |
| Ms. MARÍA JOSÉ GARCÍA BEATO | 465 | 9.93 | 423 | 22.61 | 345 | 10.93 | 311 | -49.02 | 610 |
| Ms. MIREYA GINÉ TORRENS | 230 | 17.95 | 195 | 11.43 | 175 | 16.67 | 150 | 284.62 | 39 |
| Ms. LAURA GONZÁLEZ MOLERO | 195 | 34.48 | 145 | 383.33 | 30 | - | 0 | - | 0 |
| Mr. GEORGE DONALD JOHNSTON III | 244 | 18.45 | 206 | 15.73 | 178 | -5.32 | 188 | 0.00 | 188 |
| Mr. DAVID MARTÍNEZ GUZMÁN | 125 | 31.58 | 95 | -5.00 | 100 | 0.00 | 100 | 0.00 | 100 |
| Mr. JOSÉ MANUEL MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ | 52 | -69.41 | 170 | -5.56 | 180 | 7.78 | 167 | 21.01 | 138 |
| Ms. ALICIA REYES REVUELTA | 200 | 17.65 | 170 | 0.59 | 169 | -20.66 | 213 | - | 0 |
| Mr. MANUEL VALLS MORATÓ | 235 | 32.02 | 178 | 14.84 | 155 | -8.82 | 170 | -5.56 | 180 |
| Mr. PEDRO VIÑOLAS SERRA | 205 | 127.78 | 90 | - | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 |
| Consolidated results of the company | | | | | | | | | |
| | 2,513,899 | 32.96 | 1,890,780 | 52.16 | 1,242,646 | 100.43 | 619,990 | - | -120,830 |

| | Total amounts accrued and % change per annum | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|-----------------------|------|-----------------------|------|-----------------------|------|-----------------------|------|
| | 2024 | % Change 2024/2023 | 2023 | % Change 2023/2022 | 2022 | % Change 2022/2021 | 2021 | % Change 2021/2020 | 2020 |
| Average employee remuneration | | | | | | | | | |
| | 68 | 4.62 | 65 | 3.17 | 63 | 6.78 | 59 | 9.26 | 54 |

D. OTHER INFORMATION OF INTEREST

This Annual Remuneration Report was approved by the company's Board of Directors at a meeting on:

[29/01/2025]

Indicate whether any board members voted against or abstained with respect to the approval of this report.

[] Yes

[☒] No

